I have been working on some lengthy essays for readers, but these are taking more time than expected and I wanted to deliver a Thursday afternoon blog as I usually do (which will be late anyway). I have had it mind for some time to write about William James, a pioneering figure in pragmatic American philosophy, psychology, and theology and his seminal 1902 work The Varieties of Religious Experience, which deeply impressed me as a child. Central to his exploration of religious experience are the contrasting concepts of the “once-born” and the “twice-born,” which illuminate different paths individuals may take not only in their religious or spiritual lives, but in their pursuit of knowledge more generally. As an atheist, I am more interested in the latter.
I discuss James in Social Theory, a senior level class I teach at the university, There I cover his conceptualization of the problem of the “self” (James defines several types). I used James’ dichotomy in an April of 2020 essay, Striving to Be Twice Born in a World of Partisan Ideology, written as I was checking objectivity amid the mass hysteria of the coronavirus pandemic. Today I provide a more general treatment which will serve as a prelude to the aforementioned essays in production (these concern fascism and the necessity of republican governance frameworks for human freedom and thriving).
James introduces the term “once-born” to describe individuals whose religious experiences unfold in a relatively straightforward manner. For them, faith and spirituality are integrated into their lives harmoniously and without significant conflict. Their religious beliefs provide a stable framework that aligns with their personal values and worldview. They may adhere to religious practices and teachings without undergoing profound crises of faith or intense emotional upheaval. James portrays these individuals as enjoying a sense of continuity in their religious experience, where faith serves as a source of comfort and moral guidance rather than a catalyst for radical personal transformation. One might associated the “once-born” with traditional expressions of religious faith.
In contrast, James uses the term “twice-born” to characterize those who undergo profound spiritual or religious transformations—and who use these experiences to radically transform their identities. These individuals experience periods of intense emotional turmoil, moral crises, or existential doubt that challenge their existing beliefs and values. Their religious or spiritual journey is marked by moments of internal conflict and profound struggle, often leading to a reevaluation of their worldview and identity, but not always, I will be discussed below. The metaphor of being “twice-born” suggests a metaphorical rebirth or renewal, where individuals emerge from their spiritual crises with a deeper understanding of themselves and a transformed perspective on life and faith. But they may also emerge from their crisis profoundly at odds with reality and self-interests.
James’ distinction between the “once-born” and the “twice-born” reflects his broader interest in the diversity of human religious experiences and the psychological dynamics at play. He suggests that while some individuals may find solace and spiritual fulfillment through a more conventional and stable religious path, others undergo profound inner struggles that ultimately lead to deeper spiritual insights and personal growth—as well as angst and trepidation. Many studies have found a positive correlation between happiness and well-being and traditional religious and cultural involvement. These associations are attributable to several factors. Traditional beliefs and communities provide strong social networks and support systems, impart a sense of meaning and purpose in life, and provide coping mechanisms during times of stress or adversity. Crucially, then, the study of religious experiences goes beyond theological doctrines or institutional practices; it encompasses the subjective and deeply personal dimensions of faith and spirituality, highlighting the complexity of human spiritual experiences and the transformative potential inherent in religious crises and rebirths.
While in graduate school, I picked up a copy of Jürgen Habermas’ 1973 Legitimation Crisis and found in there a quote by Kenneth Kenniston, known for his work on adolescence, youth culture, and social change, that adapts James’ dichotomy. He uses James to illustrate the meaning of an unconventional outcome of the adolescent crisis, which was the subject of considerable discussion given the radical student youth movement during the latter years of the Vietnam War (a concern that the current turmoil once again makes relevant), by pointing, Habermas notes, “to the reflective attitude toward socially tendered patterns of interpretation which the youth acquires and which allows him, in coming to terms with these cultural interpretations, to work out his definition of identity for himself.”
Kenniston writes: “We will need to distinguish more sharply than we have done so far between attitudes and belief systems on the one hand and the cognitive frameworks or developmental levels within which any given attitude or belief is held. William James long ago contrasted the once-born and the twice-born; the once-born are those who unreflectively and ‘innocently’ accept the convictions of their childhoods; the twice-born are those who may adhere to exactly the same convictions, but who do so in a different way after a protracted period of doubt, criticism, and examination of those beliefs. Viewed as attitudes, the beliefs of the once-born and the twice-born may be identical, but the mind-set, cognitive framework, or developmental level of the once- and twice-born are extremely different. In other words, we need to examine not only the beliefs men hold, but the way they hold them-the complexity, richness, and structure of their views of the world. Politically and socially, it may be more important that members of a given subculture possess a relativistic view of truth than that they are conservatives or liberals.”
This line about the need “to examine not only the beliefs men hold, but the way they hold them-the complexity, richness, and structure of their views of the world” is a vitally important one point to grasp. Habermas found in this clarification of his purpose in writing Legitimation Crisis: “With the help of this distinction, I can express my thesis as follows: the components of the cultural tradition that are today dominant (and dysfunctional in their working) are more likely to be reflected at the level of the personality system, the more frequently the form of development of the adolescent crisis forces a ‘second birth’ and prevents a conventional outcome of adolescence. For logical reasons, universalistic value systems and countercultural experiential complexes most readily withstand the explicit testing of tradition.”
Habermas is arguing that the dysfunctional components of today’s dominant cultural traditions have a significant impact on shaping individual personality development. This influence is particularly pronounced when adolescents experience a transformative crisis, akin to a “second birth,” rather than following a conventional path of adolescent development. The thesis posits that dysfunctional cultural elements, such as we saw with the emergence of globalization, are more likely to shape personality traits under these circumstances. Habermas argues that value systems that are universalistic and experiential that challenge conventional norms are more resilient against explicit testing of tradition, highlighting their potential to withstand and critique prevailing cultural norms effectively. These value systems often provide broader perspectives, alternative frameworks, or deeper insights that can critique and potentially reform prevailing cultural norms more effectively than more rigid or narrowly defined traditions, the function of which is to perpetuate conventional norms. In other words, these values offer a resilience against uncritical acceptance of tradition and encourage ongoing dialogue and reflection on cultural values and practices.
Returning to Habermas: “That the probability of a conventional form of development of the adolescent crisis is decreasing can be supported by the following indicators: expansion of the educational system is lengthening training periods and making possible for increasing proportions of the population a psycho-social moratorium in early adolescence (from the thirteenth to the sixteenth year) and an extension of this phase (in extreme cases, to the age of 30); improved formal schooling of cognitive capacities increases the probability that dissonances between proffered patterns of interpretation and perceived social reality will arise and intensify the problem of identity; development of egalitarian family structures and spread of childrearing techniques typical of the middle classes [that] promote processes of socialization that tend to burden youth with adolescent problems; loosening of sexual prohibitions made possible by pharmaceutics [that] works itself out (as does the temporary liberation—differentiated according to strata—from directly economic pressures) in such a way that socialization processes free of anxiety, with an expanded scope of experimentation, become more probable for adolescents.”
“Furthermore,” Habermas continues, “it can be inferred from the presently attained degree of complexity of the role system that in advanced-capitalist societies more and more members have at their disposal basic universalistic qualifications for action within roles. Since a morality based on principle can be credibly offered by tradition only in the form of communicative ethics, which cannot function without conflict in the political-economic system, two outcomes are to be expected from a non-conventional form of development of the adolescent crisis: (1) withdrawal as a reaction to an overloading of personality resources (a behavioral syndrome that Kenniston has observed and examined in the ‘alienated’) and (2) protest as a result of an autonomous ego organization that cannot be stabilized under the given conditions.”
There is a lot here that I will take up in the pending essays I noted at the outset. However, I want to make one point here before leaving the present essay. While I agree with the testing of convention—and throughout my writings I appeal to universalistic principles and values as means to this end—the argument overlooks potential risks associated with questioning convention, especially among youth, today guided by the transgressive methodology associated with woke progressivism, most obviously in the method of queering, i.e., the challenging of normative boundaries (such as those involved in child safeguarding), transformation of public spaces according to the doctrines of a neo-religion, and the normalization of compelled speech in the face of the fundamental human rights to free conscience and speech. As I will discuss in those pending essays, this constitutes a neo-fascist standpoint that threatens the future of constitutional republics across the transatlantic space. Radical disjunctures in the collective personality of youth in mass societies do not always yield progressive results, as Mao’s Cultural Revolution makes plain.
Indeed, while universalistic and experiential value systems can offer valuable critiques of prevailing norms, the assumption that they inherently lead to constructive reform ignores the variability in youths’ reflective capacities and maturity levels. For many young individuals, questioning tradition without sufficient understanding or guidance can result in confusion, identity crises, or even disillusionment. The process may leave them adrift without a solid foundation to navigate life’s complexities, potentially leading to feelings of alienation or detachment from societal norms altogether. Moreover, while challenging mainstream norms can foster critical thinking and innovation, it also risks undermining essential societal structures that provide stability and continuity, which are crucial for social cohesion and individual well-being.
Therefore, while encouraging critical reflection on cultural values is important, it must be balanced with nurturing a nuanced understanding of tradition and providing supportive frameworks for young people to develop their identities and moral compasses responsibly. How is this possible when young people are at war with their elders? We are, comrades, in a new legitimation crisis. I wish to leave you with these passages early in Habermas’ book, which touches on many things that concern me on the pages of Freedom and Reason:
“Prior to its employment as a social-scientific term, the concept of crisis was familiar to us from its medical usage. In that context it refers to the phase of an illness in which it is decided whether or not the organism’s self-healing powers are sufficient for recovery. The critical process, the illness, appears as something objective. A contagious disease, for example, is contracted through external influences on the organism; and the deviations of the affected organism from its goal state [Sollzustand]—the normal, healthy state—can be observed and measured with the aid of empirical parameters. The patient’s consciousness plays no role in this; how he feels, how he experiences his illness, is at most a symptom of a process that he himself can scarcely influence at all. Nevertheless, we would not speak of a crisis, when it is medically a question of life and death, if it were only a matter of an objective process viewed from the outside, if the patient were not also subjectively involved in this process. The crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it—the patient experiences his powerlessness vis-a-vis the objectivity of the illness only because he is a subject condemned to passivity and temporarily deprived of the possibility of being a subject in full possession of his powers.
“We therefore associate with crises the idea of an objective force that deprives a subject of some part of his normal sovereignty. To conceive of a process as a crisis is tacitly to give it a normative meaning—the resolution of the crisis effects a liberation of the subject caught up in it.”
freedom and reason 