Fundamental Law Regarding Freedom of Thought and Conscience

One man’s opinion is that men can be women. Another man’s opinion is that men cannot be women. Of course the second opinion is the correct opinion from a scientific standpoint. But this is no reason to prevent the first man from uttering a falsehood. This is his opinion and he has a right to it. An institution or organization may tell the second man that he is not allowed his opinion because it offends those men who believe they are women, that if he intends to articulate this opinion he will face consequences, which can range from suppression of his opinion in forums where his opinion is relevant and orderly, such as in a science classroom or library conference room, to disciplinary action including termination of employment, but any of these actions against him violate his fundamental rights as a free person, not only his right to his opinion, but his right to his conscience.

AI generated impression of free thought

Both men’s opinions are protected under the fundamental law of this country as codified by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Article One of the US Bill of Rights states:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” This article has been fully incorporated in the states by Supreme Court ruling. This article guarantees several fundamental rights: freedom of religion or conscience, freedom of speech and thought, freedom of the press, the right to assemble peacefully, and the right to petition the government for grievances. Implicit in these rights is also the freedom of association.

Both men’s opinions are further protected under the intentional system of human rights, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles 18 and 19. Article 18 states  “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” Article 19 states:  “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

In addition to the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) further elaborates these rights and provides a legally binding framework to ensure their protection on an international level. Article 18: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching.” The article continues: “No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”

Article 19 of the ICCPR states: “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” It clarifies that the exercise of the rights articulated in this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”

By rights of others, the article means to clarify that one may not use actions or utterances to interfere with the right of others to freely express opinions in relevant and orderly forums. By reputations of others, the clarification is referencing the problems of libel and slander, a clarification that has been interpreted by many nation-states as applying also to abstractions, i.e., groups based on some shared characteristics, in addition to concrete persons or individuals. Fortunately, defamation laws in the United States pertain to false statements that harm an individual’s reputation. The law in this area focuses on protecting an individual’s reputation from false statements. The application of defamation laws is not directly tied to suspect categories as in the context of equal protection under civil rights law. Overcoming the problem of identity remains part of the struggle for individual liberty in many countries.

Limitations for the protection of national security, while necessary, has been abused severely (in the United States, the federal government classifies tens of millions of documents annually). Restrictions on speech for the protection of public order is not particularly problematic if understood in terms of a greater appreciation for the freedom of individuals. Protecting the public order curtails the heckler’s veto, as well as allows the state to quell riots.

However, restrictions in the name of public health and public morals are problematic. If certain forms of expression or communication pose a clear and significant risk to public health, governments may argue that restrictions are necessary to prevent harm to individuals or the community at large. An example of this could be the spread of false health information that could lead to public harm. If certain content or communication provides misleading or dangerous advice about health treatments or medical procedures, it might be restricted to protect the health and safety of individuals who might act on that information.

However, the application of the exception is complicated by the corporate takeover and corruption of public health and the substitution of scientism, i.e., science as ideology, for actual science (scientific materialist epistemic). We saw this during the COVID-19 pandemic. The use of public health as a justification for restricting freedom of expression must be subject to scrutiny, which depends on a free republic that observes the rules of free thought and expression, as well as conscience. It’s important for governments to demonstrate that the restriction is proportionate, necessary, and based on genuine concerns, i.e., scientifically demonstrable reasons, for public health, rather than being used as a pretext to suppress dissent or unpopular opinions.

Finally, concerning the issue of public morals, if this pertains to child safeguarding or the protection of individuals used for such purposes, then restrictions on pornography represent an exception to the free speech rule. The classification and regulation of pornography can be influenced by cultural and societal perceptions of what is considered morally acceptable or unacceptable. Different countries and legal systems have varying standards when it comes to defining and regulating pornography. Some countries may view certain forms of pornography as contrary to their concept of public morals and thus subject to restrictions or regulations. These restrictions might be aimed at protecting what the society considers as moral values or preventing potential harm associated with explicit content. The classification and regulation of pornography is a complex and contentious matter, often involving debates about freedom of expression, artistic expression, personal autonomy, and societal values. The balance between protecting public morals and respecting individuals’ rights to expression and privacy can be challenging and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

A Swiss woman protesting the ban on full-face covering. In 2014, the European Human Rights Court upheld such bans giving governments broad discretion on limiting the display of religious symbols.

One interesting case is the French ban on full face veils, which includes the burqa and niqab (other European countries followed suit). The law was passed in 2010 and prohibits the wearing of full face coverings in public places. The rationale behind this law includes concerns about public security, gender equality, and the preservation of French secularism (laïcité). French authorities argue that the full-face veils hinder identification in public spaces, and the law is also seen by some as a response to cultural and religious tensions in the country. The question of striking a balance between individual rights, such as freedom of religion and expression, which in the case of the burqa and niqab also needs to consider the possibility that this is a coercive practice and not individual expression of conscience, and broader societal considerations, such as those cited by the French state, lies at the heart of the controversy. In addition to the morals question, the application of such laws point to the complex cultural and legal considerations that vary from country to country.

It is vital to recognize United States sovereignty and the integrity of its fundamental law because Article 20 of the ICCPR is more problematic than some of the clarifications to the UDHR offered in the previous two articles. First, Article 20 states: “Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.” I appreciate the sentiment here and war propaganda (any propaganda) is troubling. War propaganda specifically refers to the dissemination of biased or misleading information with the intent to emotionally charge mass consciousness and shape public opinion towards war aims, thus promoting support for or participation in armed conflicts or wars. War propaganda may be employed by corporations, governments, or organizations (usually in tandem) to manipulate public sentiment, build nationalistic fervor, and demonize opponents to justify military actions (whether offensive or defensive).

There are several elements typical of war propaganda. Propagandists misrepresent facts, presenting exaggerated or false information about the causes, intentions, and motivations behind a conflict to manipulate public perception. Propaganda dehumanizes population by portraying the enemy as evil, monstrous, and subhuman to evoke strong negative emotions and justify aggressive actions. Demonization creates a negative and one-sided image of the enemy by focusing solely on selected actions or perceived and manufactured traits while ignoring any context or nuances. Appeals to patriotism, where narratives, slogans, and symbols that invoke a sense of national duty and pride are used to encourage citizens to support military actions for the greater good of the country. Eliciting strong emotional responses from the public through emotional stories, images, or videos that depict atrocities, heroism, sacrifice, and suffering with the aim of rallying support for the war effort is typical.

Obviously there is not free speech protection for governments to lie to their citizens. Governments have powers not rights. Moreover. a core part of war propaganda is censorship and suppression of dissent, which involves controlling or restricting the dissemination of opposing viewpoints, critical analyses, or information that challenges the official narrative of the conflict. Part of this involves official and self-censorship in the form of selective reporting, where incidents and information that align with the desired narrative are shared, while ignoring or downplaying information that contradicts it. It is here that the Article 20 (which moves articles 20 and 21 of the UDHR down the list, here concerning assembly and association) is consistent with Articles 18 and 19 of both the ICCPR and the UDHR. However, many elements of war propaganda are protected by Articles 18 and 19 when uttered by individuals. People alone or assembled have a fundamental right to express sentiments that built nationalistic fervor and demonize enemies to build support for military action. In many cases, such expressions should be condemned; however, outlawing them contradicts the preceding articles.

The same is true for this piece of Article 20: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” Incitement to discrimination refers to actions or speech that encourage or stimulate prejudiced attitudes and practices against individuals or groups based on their national, racial, or religious characteristics. It involves promoting or fostering a climate of bias and inequality that can result in exclusion, harm to, or unequal treatment of targeted groups. This type of incitement goes beyond simply expressing personal beliefs or opinions. It involves actively encouraging or promoting discrimination against others, often by spreading misinformation about individuals or groups, negative stereotypes, or fueling hostile attitudes. The goal of incitement to discrimination is to create an environment where the targeted groups are unfairly treated or marginalized.

Expressing derogatory remarks or offensive language about a particular ethnicity, gender, nationality, race, or religion with the intention of demeaning or belittling members of that group is often coded as hate speech. Propagating harmful stereotypes about a certain group that can lead to prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory behavior is therefore potentially an offense under Article 20 of the ICCPR in countries without strong protections of conscience and speech.

Promoting actions or policies that intentionally exclude certain groups from participating in cultural, economic, political, or societal activities based on their national, racial, or religious identity, i.e., encouraging the separation or isolation of different groups in society based on their characteristics, leading to unequal treatment and opportunities, as well as urging others to engage in discriminatory practices, such as not hiring individuals from a specific ethnicity or religion, denying them access to certain services, or treating them unfairly in various contexts—all these are potentially legally actionable if Article 20 is enforced. It is in this understanding of fundamental law that many European countries, such as France and Germany, find the basis for passing hate speech laws. 

To be sure, incitement to violence is under certain circumstances restricted speech according US law, but arguments against, for example Islam, which is a heterosexist and intolerant religion motivating control over and violence directed towards homosexuals and women, as well as towards those who do not subscribe to Islam or criticize its doctrine and practices, speech that may indeed incite discrimination and hostility towards Muslims, clearly fall under Articles 18 and 19 of the UDHR and the First Amendment of the US Bill of Rights. (I have posted a number of essays on this topic. See Threat Minimization and Ecumenical Demobilization; Refusing the Normalization of Religious Belief; The Islamists Make Another Move; The Continuing Problem of Compelled Expression; Assert Your Right to Tell the Truth; Squaring the Panic over Misogyny with World Hijab Day; The Courage to Name the Problem; Executive Order 13769: Its Character and Implications; Antagonisms to Liberty are Relentless; The Injustices of Public School Dress Codes; Offense-Taking: A Method of Social Control; )

Muslims have a right to express their heterosexist and intolerant views under these articles, as well. What Muslims do not have a right to are practices that oppress members of their group or individuals outside their group—nor do they have a right to laws that restrict the speech that may incite discrimination or hostility towards them. Discrimination in practice may be problematic, as we have seen with France’s restrictions on face coverings (I struggle with the ban on full face coverings), but discrimination in practice is a far cry from incitement to discrimination. The latter is subject to criticism and even condemnation, but it cannot be subject to criminal prosecution.

All that said, the legitimate relevance of the ICCPR and the UDHR to the fundamental law of the United States notwithstanding, international law, while demonstrating the universality of the basic premise of freedom of thought and conscience, at least among the rational nation-states (Muslim-majority countries rejected the UDHR for fear that it would undermine Sharia, i.e., Islamic law), the national sovereignty of the United States makes the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s rulings concerning that article the final say on the meaning and scope of these rights, articulated there in their highest form, demonstrating the genius of the Founders of the United States Republic.

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Andrew Austin

Andrew Austin is on the faculty of Democracy and Justice Studies and Sociology at the University of Wisconsin—Green Bay. He has published numerous articles, essays, and reviews in books, encyclopedia, journals, and newspapers.

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