The Lord of the Rings as a Meditation on the Clash of Civilizations and Peril of Technocracy

When I first read The Lord of the Rings as a teenager, my immediate impression was that it must be an allegory for the Second World War. It seemed obvious enough. Sauron represented Hitler, with National Socialism and the German war machine personifying his wickedness, and the peoples of the West stood for the Allies and the goodness of the West. In sum, the struggle against Mordor mirrored the struggle of free people against the evil of totalitarianism. Given that J.R.R. Tolkien lived through the turmoil of the twentieth century and experienced the bombing of Britain, it was tempting to read his great work as a personal meditation on that conflict.

Tolkien, however, I later learned, repeatedly denied that The Lord of the Rings was an allegory. With the benefit of age and after years of studying political economy and international relations (an expertise in my PhD), I have come to believe that his denial was sincere. Not simply because I appreciate the man’s sincerity, but because, returning to the books this spring and immersing myself in his legendarium, I see a much larger struggle across those three volumes, as well as in his other works. The story is not about one war or one dictator. Instead, it appears to be a meditation on a much older and deeper conflict: the clash of civilizations and the rise of instrumental rationality. The fight for Middle-earth is an allegory for the struggle for the integrity of the West and for the preservation of good. It is the struggle of free people against the evil of totalitarianism across time.

Image by Grok

Political scientist Samuel Huntington caused quite a stir when he wrote about a “clash of civilizations.” In his influential article (1993) and later book (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, he divided the world into major civilizations—Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Sinic, and Western—and suggested that tensions along the boundaries between these civilizations would become the main drivers of international politics in the aftermath of the Cold War. Huntington believed that deep-rooted differences in history, identity, religion, and values were more enduring than political ideologies. The theory has been widely criticized for oversimplifying cultures, treating civilizations as internally uniform. Under the influence of neo-Marxism during my PhD studies (1996-2000), I subscribed to this critique. Professors and graduate students alike saw the book as reactionary. I no longer do, and Tolkien helped me to understand why.

While Tolkien’s work predates Huntington by decades, the geography and imagery of Middle-earth suggest a similar concern. The free peoples occupy the West and Northwest: Gondor, Rivendell, Rohan, and the Shire. They represent a world of continuity, beauty, and rootedness. The Shire symbolized homeliness. On the moral compass, the people of these lands, and the other beings associated with the West—dwarves, elves, and hobbits—are good. By contrast, evil rises in the East and Southeast. The armies of Harad (South) and Rhûn (East) march from distant lands with exotic beasts and strange customs. Nearby lie Mordor and Isengard, centers not merely of military power but of corruption and domination. The East and the South are allied with Sauron, the Dark Lord, who resides in Mordor. The corrupt wizard sitting in Isengard, Sarumon, is his lieutenant. They are evil because the good eludes them; it is displaced by power for power’s sake.

Tolkien’s division is not simply racial or geographical (although it is certainly those things). It is civilizational and moral. The West in Tolkien’s imagination is characterized by harmony with nature. The beings dwelling there see God in Earthly beauty. Hobbits delight in gardens, meals, and pipe-weed (or leaf). Elves cultivate beauty and preserve memory. They also reason. The architecture of Gondor reflects elegance, order, and permanence. Societies are governed by fidelity, honor, and sacrifice. Leaders understand that there are some things worth dying for and some things that must never be done, even in the pursuit of victory. Their artifacts and structures are classical, with an emphasis on gold, silver, and whiteness, integrated with the colors and textures of nature. History is embedded in a living world. And that world is intrinsically good—albeit corruptible—and worth dying for.

In the philosophical terms I have been using on this platform of late in my explorations of Christian ethics and the Enlightenment, the free peoples of Middle-earth operate according to a moral ontology that reflects the Creator’s intentions, even if He rarely intervenes in earthly affairs. It is the obligation of His creation to preserve the world and keep its virtues. Thus, there is a transcendent order that informs terrestrial action and ethics. Means are constrained by this end: to keep the world good. The beings of the West recognize that noble purposes cannot be pursued through ignoble methods. Morality is not a tool, but an objective reality. Those who move in its name are accountable to it. They do what is right for its own sake. For the most part. Those who don’t meet terrible fates.

Tolkien’s tale of the Númenóreans is vital to understanding the men of the West and the corruptibility of man’s nature. The Númenóreans were a race of men in Tolkien’s legendarium, rewarded by the Valar after helping defeat Morgoth at the end of the First Age with the gift of the island kingdom of Númenor, located between Middle-earth and the Undying Lands. There, they developed into a highly advanced civilization renowned for its craftsmanship, enlightenment, and seafaring. Known for their long lifespans, they were nonetheless mortal.

Over time, however, many Númenóreans grew resentful of their mortality and turned away from the Valar under the influence of Sauron. They attempted to invade the Undying Lands to obtain immortality. This led to the catastrophic downfall of Númenor. The city-state was destroyed and sank beneath the sea. A faithful minority, those who resisted Sauron, led by figures such as Elendil and his sons, escaped to Middle-earth and founded the kingdoms of Arnor and Gondor.

In Tolkien’s history, the Númenóreans represent both the highest achievements of humanity and the dangers of pride, ambition, and the desire to escape death. To be sure, the longing for immorality is common among men. However, for the Númenóreans, natural longing became a consuming ambition that inspired offensive war. Those who survived the downfall of Númenor thus bore their sin. Their descendants, represented by Aragorn in the novel, organized their ethical system around the need to contain destructive ambition. They were mindful of the error of their forebearers. They did not abandon war. Their warriors were great men of renown. Rather, organized violence was a means to defend the good that their ancestors had abandoned. Good confronted evil for the sake of good. They fought to keep the world right and open, not straight and narrow.

The powers of darkness, by contrast, embody instrumentalism. For Sauron and his lieutenant Saruman, power itself is the highest “good.” Any means are acceptable if they advance domination over nature and its creatures. Betrayal, coercion, deception, and terror are merely techniques. Nothing but power possesses intrinsic value—not beauty, not forests, not traditions, and certainly not individuals. The architecture is brutalist, the emphasis on blackness, a blackness that stands apart from nature, at the same time, corrupting it. Sauron’s lair of Barad-dûr was dark and forbidding, its gates black. Orthanc, in Isengard, where Saruman perched, was black and bladed. The abode of the Witch-king of Angmar, Minas Morgul, is an exception only because this city was originally Minas Ithil (“Tower of the Moon”) and belonged to Gondor. Captured by the Nazgûl, its beauty was replaced by an unnatural, corpse-like glow. The good was pushed out, and wickedness rushed into the vacuum.

We have to leave the events of The Lord of the Rings and travel back in time, to the First Age, to understand how central these concerns are in Tolkien’s moral universe. Morgoth—originally Melkor—was the most powerful of the Ainur (angelic beings) created by Eru Ilúvatar (the God of Middle-earth). Melkor became the first Dark Lord through pride and a desire to impose his own will upon creation. He rebelled against God and the Ainur. So he became Morgoth. Over time, Morgoth poured his native power into the physical world itself, becoming increasingly bound to it.

His lieutenant and later successor, Sauron, originally a Maia (wizard) of great stature who first served Aulë, the Valor of craft and smithing (the Valar are those among the Ainur who governed the created world), before being seduced by Morgoth’s promise of control and efficiency. Sauron helped organize Morgoth’s forces, forge weapons, and spread corruption among elves and men. There are also in the West the orcs, who are corrupted beings of some sort. After Morgoth’s defeat and expulsion into the Void at the end of the First Age, Sauron emerged as the new Dark Lord in Middle-earth, especially in the Second and Third Ages, seeking dominion through cunning, deception, and the forging of the One Ring—the ring to rule them all.

Nowhere is the contrast between good and evil in the events of The Lord of the Rings clearer than in Isengard. Saruman, like Gandalf, a Maia, a lesser being to the Ainur but nonetheless very powerful, possessing the art of magic, was once wise. He was the greatest of wizards of his day. However, he abandoned his reverence for creation in favor of mastery over it. He tears down forests to feed furnaces to manufacture the Uruk-hai, a breed of stronger, more disciplined orcs in Tolkien’s legendarium.

Under Saruman’s designs, nature becomes raw material. His realm is one of wheels, smoke, and terrible machines—and of industrial efficiency. The Uruk-hai themselves are Promethean products rather than the natural results of inheritance—a kind of grotesque parody of creation. Saruman, like Victor Frankenstein, makes monsters. These are not nurtured beings, but abominations engineered by destructive ambition. The technocracy of Isengard stands near Fangorn Forest, and it is this forest that Saruman exploits to feed his machine, eventually incurring the wrath of the tree-like beings that live there, the Ents.

To put this in the terms I have been writing about on Freedom and Reason, Saruman represents a nightmare vision of technocracy: the reduction of life to process, production, and utility bereft of aesthetics. The organic world is sacrificed to mechanism. Human beings become resources to be manipulated rather than souls to be cultivated. Natural design is replaced by synthetic substitutes, evil because they defy God’s creation.

Long before contemporary discussions about technological domination and transhumanism, Tolkien sensed the danger of a civilization that worships efficiency while forgetting wisdom—that replaces the natural with the artificial (in this way, his insights resonate with those of Walter Benjamin in his essay “Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”). The orcs are not merely a sinister force against which Tolkien’s heroes battle; the orcs symbolize corruption rather than authentic creation. Although Tolkien wrestled throughout his life with their origins, he consistently emphasized that evil cannot truly create. It can only distort and mutilate what already exists. Evil is parasitic. It produces counterfeits. Against this darkness stand ordinary people, humble and noble.

One of the most remarkable features of The Lord of the Rings is that salvation does not come through overwhelming force alone. Our heroes are often outnumbered. On the brink of catastrophe, tides miraculously turn. The eagles are not merely an instance of the literary device of deus ex machina, which seems to many a contrivance, but are representative of what Tolkien meant by his coined term eucatastrophe, the opposite of catastrophe. He wondered: can’t dramatic twists be of good fortune? No, salvation comes because the cause is honorable: it defends the good of the world, whatever the cost in blood and treasure (although, admittedly, the dwarves are stubborn on that last point).

Crucially, the West does not seek to wield the One Ring to defeat Sauron. Instead, it seeks to destroy the weapon entirely, thus thwarting Sauron’s ambition. Without the Ring, he cannot rule them all (indeed, the personal power he fused with the ring at its forging proves lethal). The temptation to use evil for good must be rejected by our heroes. But the heroes are flawed, and some among them succumb to temptation. Boromir of Gondor, his kingdom’s proximity to and struggle against Sauron far less abstract and remote than the others of the Fellowship, moves him to claim the ring. Even if we regard his reasoning as noble, we admit that he is also prideful and reckless. And this is his undoing.

This is perhaps the deepest moral lesson of the story. Boromir illustrates the tragedy of noble intentions corrupted by pride. He loves Gondor and genuinely wishes to save his people, yet he falls prey to the Ring’s promise of power. His flaw is not wickedness but grandiosity. He believes that strength can be trusted in the hands of the righteous, but his loyalty is to Gondor at the exclusion of the greater good. For Tolkien, power itself corrupts. The war is not for Gondor alone. And, in any case, the One Ring cannot aid in the greater struggle. It therefore must be destroyed. The mission to destroy it is for the sake of the West and all that is good in the world. And, so, the task falls to the smallest among those dwelling in the West, those with the least ambition of all beings, the least interested in power, the Hobbits.

Boromir’s father is also beset by narrow concern. Aragorn, the heir of Isildur, son of Elendil, the man who cut the One Ring from Sauron’s hand in the Second Age in the Battle of the Last Alliance (but failed to cast it into the fires of Mount Doom), is destined to be king and restore integrity to Middle-earth. Boromir’s father, Denethor II, the ruling Steward of Gondor, does not wish for the return of the king. It is a threat to his power. He is moreover in possession of a palantír. Like others who use this technology, he draws the wrong conclusion from its visions across distance and time. He believes the war is lost and, thus, his power. Death is preferable to such an end.

In Tolkien’s world, bad deeds are punished. Boromir dies at the hands of the Uruk-hai near the borders of the northern realm of Rohan, in the region of Amon Hen, on the western shore of the Great River Anduin. Denethor self-immolates at Minas Tirith, the great fortified capital of Gondor, during the siege of the city in the Battle of the Pelennor Fields. Likewise, good deeds are rewarded. Denethor’s younger son, Faramir, by contrast, embodies wisdom. He loves his brother and mourns his death, yet he understands what destroyed him.

Unlike Boromir, Faramir recognizes that some victories are too costly. When Frodo and Sam come into his hands, he refuses to seize the Ring and allows the hobbits to continue their seemingly hopeless mission. Faramir’s greatness lies not in conquest but in restraint (he is a lesser warrior in the shadow of his older brother). Faramir possesses the strength to take the Ring and the humility not to. He is perhaps the finest example of Tolkien’s ideal of nobility: a man governed by honor rather than ambition. Aragorn makes Faramir the Prince of Gondor after the enemy is defeated and the heir of Isildur returns to the throne. Faramir and his bride, Éowyn, the niece of Rohan’s king, live happily ever after.

This same spirit prevails throughout the free peoples. Aragorn, of the Dúnedain, the noble descendants of the Númenóreans, accepts burdens rather than privileges. He dwells in the wilderness among the remnants of his race as a ranger until he is called to action. Freed from Saruman’s spell, King Théoden of Rohan rides to almost certain death for the sake of others. Sam remains loyal to Frodo and the quest when hope itself has vanished because he must believe there is good in the world. The men of the West march upon the Black Gate not because they expect victory but because duty demands it. They are willing to lay down their lives so that others may live free.

The Lord of the Rings speaks directly to our present age. Sauron, the Dark Lord whose shadow spreads from Mordor, embodies the instrumental spirit of technocratic globalism and transnational corporate power. The One Ring is not merely a weapon but the promise of total control: addictive and corrosive to all who grasp it. This manifests as the fusion of financialized capital and supranational institutions, enabled by Big Tech algorithmic governance and surveillance architecture, that seek to remake humanity and nature alike into raw material for optimization, prediction, and profit. The Eye of Sauron watches from digital panopticons, reducing persons to data profiles. His power reduces societies to nodes in a global supply chain. Computer terminals are palantír from which users draw mistaken conclusions.

Beauty, memory, and moral limits are obstacles. They are also opportunities to be monetized, transcended, or twisted. The architecture of the New Mordor is brutalist and black: server farms consuming energy and devouring landscapes, sterile glass towers of Davos and Silicon Valley, and a culture of inversion where the inherited and natural are pathologized, while the artificial and transgressive are elevated—and celebrated. The bodies of men are modified to escape their natural form.

In my reading, Saruman stands for the internal betrayal within the West itself. Sitting at the southern end of the valley called Nan Curunír, in the western part of Rohan’s neighborhood, Isengard is part of the geography of the West. Once a steward of order and wisdom, Saurman turns Isengard into a forge of machines, fells the ancient trees of Fangorn, and breeds the Uruk-hai as disposable shock troops of offensive warfare. One might say that Isengard goes south. Today, Saruman is plural—the globalist technocrats and managerial elites who have hollowed out Western institutions from within. They tear down the cultural forests, so to speak—the inherited norms of family, faith, nation, and local community—to fuel the furnaces of growth and the destruction of nature. The traditional ways of life are scheduled for liquidation.

Amid the rise of the corporate state and technocracy, the organic bonds of civilizational inheritance are replaced by synthetic constructs: bureaucratic process, engineered demographics, and financial abstraction. Like Saruman and the power over him, these forces ally with the darkness beyond the West, importing or empowering the barbarians of the South and East (Huntington’s civilizational fault lines), not out of genuine universalism (however much they peddle the ideology of multiculturalism), but because these populations serve as both cheap labor and a battering ram against the true universalism of the West, its virtues standing as the embodiment of good. The resulting clash is not abstract; it is the collision of rooted, morally ordered civilization with rootless, power-oriented instrumentalism.

The corruption of the West by corporatocracy and globalism mirrors the fall of Númenor and the tragic flaws of Boromir and Denethor. At least if evil is allowed to prevail. Many of the descendants of the faithful who escaped the Downfall—those who should steward the best of Judeo-Christian ethics, Enlightenment reason tempered by natural limits, and republican self-government—have grown prideful and shortsighted. Those who know better are consumed by personal ambition. Some men, like Denethor, gazing into the palantír, see decline as inevitable. Others grasp at the ring of technological power, believing they can wield it for “good” outcomes. They wrap their designs in the language of “progress.”

The faithful remnant of Númenor’s spirit before the corruption of the desire for immortality—Aragorn’s line, Faramir’s wisdom—appears today in those who refuse the Ring entirely: cultural conservatives, decentralizers, localists, and ordinary citizens who resist mass surveillance and transhumanist futures, who reject the sacrifice of sovereignty on the altar of efficiency and profit. They understand that some powers are too great for mortal hands, no matter how righteous the cause appears. They seek not to destroy technology altogether. Science brings many conveniences. Rather, they seek to limit its reach and power by wrapping it in an ethical system that puts man and nature first.

Like our heroes, we can see other enemies. The peoples of the East and South, mobilized or drawn into Sauron’s orbit, represent the external civilizational pressures Huntington identified. Not every individual from those regions is an orc, any more than every Westerner is noble; Tolkien’s world is nuanced. Yet the alliance of instrumental technocracy with mass movements from incompatible civilizational zones produces the same pattern: waves of disruption that weaken the West’s capacity for self-defense, while the Dark Tower grows stronger. Harad and Rhûn march not always with conscious malice toward the West’s soul, but their differing demographic vitality and cultural and religious systems are weaponized by Saruman’s calculus of power. In the great scheme of things, this makes the Haradrim and the Easterlings evil by default because the West is good, and the barbarians seek to subdue it.

Meanwhile, the free peoples—the Shire’s hobbits tending their gardens, the Riders of Rohan defending their hearths, the men of Gondor bracing the walls—are the citizens of the West who still value beauty, continuity, restraint, and transcendent accountability. Their strength lies not in matching the enemy’s brutality or adopting its tools without limit, but in refusing to become like the enemy. They march to the Black Gate not because victory is assured by material superiority, but because duty to good demands it.

Patriotic men of the West, who seek restoration of the sovereign nation-state and all the rights that sovereignty entails, grasp that there are no entitlements without duties. They are subservient not to instrumental rationality, but to their peoples and their great works. They recognize that defending their nations and their virtues requires alliances among other peoples of like mind and sometimes war to secure their future. Thus, a warrior class remains battle-ready and vigilant. Great stories are spun commemorating their deeds. They are made models of courage and valor.

Civilization endures not through superior technique or by out-maneuvering the forces of domination with their own methods, but through the moral refusal to let the world be reduced to a resource. The West’s renewal cannot come from demographic replacement, endless economic globalization, or ever more sophisticated systems of control. It can only happen despite these things (for these things portend its doom): from a humble recommitment to the moral ontology that lies at the heart of Western civilization, that is the belief that the created world is intrinsically good, that humans are accountable to a transcendent order, and that some things—the beauty of inherited landscapes and cultures, the dignity of the person, the integrity of the family and polity—must never be forsaken.

The greatest victories belong to those like Sam, who carry the burden through darkness because they remember the stars and the Shire, to Faramir and the decision to see the ring destroyed rather than brought to Gondor, and to Aragorn, who accepts kingship as a burdensome duty rather than personal apotheosis. In this reading, The Lord of the Rings is far from an exercise in escapism. It is a call to defend what remains of the West against the gathering shadow of technocratic Mordor and its allies, with hope rooted not in power, but in fidelity to the good.

In the end, The Lord of the Rings is not simply a fantasy novel, nor is it merely a disguised retelling of World War II. It is a profound reflection on the perennial struggle between two visions of existence. One vision sees the world as something to be inherited, loved, and protected. It prizes beauty, loyalty, memory, and moral limits. The other sees the world as material to be dominated and manipulated. It exalts efficiency above virtue and power above wisdom. Tolkien’s enduring message is that civilization survives not because good is stronger than evil in a material sense, but because there remain men who refuse to surrender their souls to destructive ambition. The greatest victory is not the conquest of one’s enemies, but the refusal to become like them.

* * *

For much of my career as a professional sociologist (more than thirty years now), I have principally relied on a methodology derived from Marxist historiography and its anthropological framing. The materialist conception of history provides a compelling account of the rise of capitalism and industrialism in the context of feudal social relations.

The Lord of the Rings echoes this transformation with the rise of Isengard and the peril it brings to the inhabitants of the West. The obvious difference is that the extreme resource exploitation under industrialization and the warping of social relations associated with it are defeated in the book, and the characters live happily ever after (except for the elf-maiden Arwen, who, having forsaken immortality, dies of grief after Aragorn’s death). In the real world, industrialization has triumphed, and the character of the social relations Tolkien valued has been degraded. In this sense, the tale of the One Ring is a reimagining of modernity’s trajectory, obvious in the author’s day. This, I think, is what makes the book so timeless. The reader cannot help but wish to return to the values of our heroes.

However, the materialist conception of history is not the only sociological frame Tolkien’s tale brings to mind for somebody who has dedicated half of his life to the discipline. Striking also is the relevance of the sociologies of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, the other two founders of the discipline in the nineteenth century. Another body of social theory that also stands out in this regard is the work of Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School. Known as Critical Theory (a boogeyman for the political right), this work synthesizes Marx and Weber along with the psychodynamic approach developed by Sigmund Freud to form a critique of instrumental rationality and the total transformation of social life. I will deal with each in turn in this section.

In Durkheim’s account, the transition in the character of social solidarity from mechanical (face-to-face communal relations) to organic (impersonal cosmopolitan relations) brought immense gains in productivity and social complexity. At the same time, it weakened the shared moral consciousness that had once bound communities together. As social life became increasingly differentiated and specialized—inherent tendencies in bureaucratic and industrial logic—occurring alongside the emergence of individualism, individuals were integrated less by common beliefs and shared values than by functional interdependence.

Tolkien’s lament for the destruction wrought by Saruman’s “mind of metal and wheels” mirrors Durkheim’s concern that social development can outpace moral integration. The uprooting of traditional communities, the subordination of inherited ways of life to economic efficiency, and the resulting condition of anomie—Durkheim’s term for the loss of meaning in normative structures—find echoes in Tolkien’s portrayal of a world in which ancient bonds between people, place, and memory are progressively eroded by the demands of production and power.

Weber’s analysis complements this theme by describing the triumph of instrumental rationality and bureaucratic organization. The Protestant ethic, which once invested economic activity with transcendent meaning (“the calling”), paradoxically gave rise to a system that no longer required the religious convictions that had animated it. What remained was the “spirit of capitalism” stripped of its religious foundations, leaving individuals trapped in what Weber famously called an “iron cage” of rational calculation and administrative efficiency.

Tolkien’s distrust of machinery was never merely a rejection of technology itself, but of the mentality that reduces forests to timber, landscapes to resources, and creatures to objects of utility. Saruman exemplifies precisely this kind of disenchanted rationality: brilliant, efficient, and technically sophisticated, yet blind to the intrinsic value of the natural world and ultimately destructive of the very order he seeks to master. This is the paradox of the irrationalism of rationality. Personality and enchantment have always been central to human thriving, yet, from the standpoint of capitalism, especially in its corporate form, depersonalization and disenchantment are necessary to a rational and secular world. In this sense, Weber’s diagnosis of modernity illuminates Tolkien’s concern that the means of control and organization can come to dominate the ends they were originally intended to serve. Tolkien’s elves elevated reason, yet they never abandoned nature and tradition.

In his synthesis of Marx, Weber, and Freud, Adorno, a contemporary of Tolkien, deepened this critique by arguing that modern societies increasingly become “administered worlds,” in which bureaucratic and technological systems penetrate every sphere of life and subordinate human purposes to the imperatives of organization, efficiency, and control. Under such conditions, reason itself becomes instrumental, losing its capacity for reflection and moral judgment. Nature, culture, and even persons are transformed into objects to be exploited and managed.

Tolkien’s vision resonates profoundly with this concern. The devastation of Isengard and the scouring of the Shire (in the movie, only a vision in the Mirror of Galadriel of what may come to pass) depict not simply environmental destruction but the spread of an ethos in which everything is under the command of Saruman’s instrumental rationality. Against this tendency stands Tolkien’s insistence upon beauty, memory, stewardship, and tradition—values that resist quantification and refuse to subordinate the created world entirely to human purposes.

In this way, the applicability of Tolkien’s work to the present age lies not in any one-to-one correspondence with contemporary events, but in its capacity to disclose the moral and spiritual costs of a civilization increasingly organized according to the logic of administration and the domination of man and nature.

* * *

I worked on this essay all of last week. I kept poring over the draft from fear that I had read too much into Tolkien. Last night, rather than trudging back through the vast body of Tolkien’s work and the scholarship surrounding it, I returned to the extended DVDs I have been watching for the last few weeks. The set contains six appendices containing twenty-plus hours of material, including, crucially, the life and works of J.R.R. Tolkien with commentary by experts. There, I learned I was not off the mark, that the concerns I have for the world Tolkien also shared, even if he did not live to see the last several decades of world history.

Commentators made a distinction between allegory and applicability that I find essential for understanding the message of The Lord of the Rings. I do not reject allegory; far from it. One of the most influential books in my life is George Orwell’s Animal Farm, a powerful allegory for the perils of state socialism. We know to whom Orwell is referring in this work. Tolkien famously disliked allegory, and he was adamant that his novel was not one. He felt the practice imposed the author’s intended meaning on readers, believing instead that readers should be free to find their own connections between the story and real life. Still, Tolkien worked from a moral standpoint, and this standpoint guides his writing. The themes of corruption, death, hope, mercy, providence, and sacrifice are present throughout the work.

Tolkien’s position was not that stories should be meaningless or lack symbolism. Rather, he believed symbolism should remain rich and open-ended, not reduced to a fixed code where elements correspond to a single real-world counterpart. That said, there are recurring patterns in Tolkien’s work that readers must take to heart: the imagery of growth, decay, and restoration; his affection for forests, rivers, and unspoiled landscapes; a suspicion of factories, machines, and industrial domination; consideration of the moral weight given to stewardship versus domination; and the trauma of oppression and war. His pitting of industrialization against nature can be read as a moral framing of domination over creation, the corruption of good (for Tolkien, evil is the absence of good), the blunting of ecological sensitivity, and nostalgia for pre-industrial England.

Even more than pre-industrial nostalgia, Tolkien appears to have pined for an English history unalterated by French ideas. His admiration for Anglo-Saxon heroic culture is obvious. His depiction of Rohan. Love of the Old English language and its poetry. Fascination with Germanic mythology. His sensitivity to cultural layering in English vocabulary. These lay at the heart of his interest in linguistics and moved him to invent a mythology, suggesting what might have developed but for events such as the Normandy invasion (significantly, after 1066, French became the language of the ruling class in England). Tolkien lamented the absence of English mythology comparable to that of the Greeks and the Norse. But now I stray beyond the scope of the present essay.

At any rate, the result of Tolkien’s work was a mythology—presented as if found history—with applicability to the times we now endure. It seems unlikely that an English mythology would have yielded stories that bear so powerfully on the present. The tales were informed by a world not so remote from our time. Tolkien’s myths are a warning. He could see the trajectory of the West. We experience the results. But myth also gives us hope that we are not locked into present circumstances. Tolkien avoids inevitabilities. Meant to be unsure of the outcome, the reader nonetheless begins the journey expecting a happy ending. Perhaps this is why, for the entirety of the twentieth century, only the Bible was read more often than The Lord of the Rings. The twenty-first century will surely find it as often read.

* * *

The Myth of the Palestinian People and the Construction of Evil

As I explained in a previous essay (History Matters, and On Matters of History, Israel Wins the Debate), the Roman Empire, which emerged between the penultimate and final centuries BC, punished the Jews, whom the Romans had subjugated during expansion, by renaming Jewish land “Syria Palestina.” Those the Romans punished were identified as Jews after Judea, the kingdom that survived the Babylonian exile circa the sixth century BC. Before they were known as Jews, they were Israelites.

The Romans derived “Palestina” from the Greek name for the Philistines (Παλαιστίνη, transliterated as Palaistī́nē), a seafaring people who colonized a strip of the Levantine coast during the Late Bronze Age around the twelfth century BC. The likely origin of the Philistines was the Aegean world, possibly including Crete and other regions of the eastern Mediterranean. They settled along the southern coastal plain of Canaan and established a confederation of five city-states: Ashdod, Ashkelon, Ekron, Gath, and Gaza.

This occurred during the period when the Israelites were consolidating their hegemony over Canaan. The story of Israel’s emergence in Canaan can be understood as a long process of migration, settlement, population growth, conflict, and state formation. This history intersects with the arrival and subsequent conflicts between Jews and Philistines and other tribes that existed in the territory.

Before the reader assumes that the Philistines have any relation to the Arabs who today assert that this territory is their own, calling themselves “Palestinians” after the Roman renaming of this land, and thus that the present-day conflict between Arabs and Jews is rooted in ancient history, the Philistines had disappeared as a people long before Arabization. The conflict between Jews and Philistines is unrelated to the conflict between Jews and so-called Palestinians that obsesses today’s antisemite.

In fact, Arabs did not exist during this time. The Arab culture and language would not exist for many centuries. To be sure, there are genetic traces of the ancient peoples of Canaan in modern-day Arabs living in the region, but this is typical of the colonial dynamic, which typically involves admixture. Genetic traces do not obviate the fact that Arab culture and language are not indigenous to Canaan any more than genetic traces of the Amerindians who preceded them make the white descendants of white Europeans indigenous to North America. Arabs are indigenous to the Arabian Peninsula, which lies Southeast of Canaan. This is a crucial fact to keep in mind. The land colonized by Arabs was the homeland of those we today call the Jews and had been for millennia.

* * *

Abraham on the threshold of Canaan (Image by Grok)

According to biblical tradition, Abram, who became Abraham, was a Semitic migrant from the region of Ur in Mesopotamia who responded to a divine call to leave his homeland and travel to Canaan. There, God established a covenant with him, promising that his descendants would become a great nation and inherit the land stretching “from the river of Egypt [the Nile] to the great river, the Euphrates” (Genesis 15:18, the promise repeated later in that book, as well as in Deuteronomy and Joshua).

Abraham’s family line continued through his son Isaac and grandson Jacob, who was later renamed Israel. Living among the Canaanite city-states of the Middle Bronze Age—a period marked by trade and urban development in the Levant—Jacob’s descendants formed the twelve tribes of Israel. This was a long time ago. The best estimates are that Abraham lived somewhere between 2200 and 1800 BC. Biblical accounts describe the eventual oppression of Jews by Egypt, followed by the Exodus under Moses and entry into Canaan under Joshua in the late thirteenth or early twelfth century BC. The people who would become Philistines began arriving shortly thereafter.

It is not the purpose of this essay to provide a detailed history of the Jewish people, only to establish major facts to make the argument. The Biblical account simplifies things, but the history is corroborated by other sources. Archaeological evidence suggests a complex process, but it does not undermine the legitimacy of the Jews’ claim to this land. Indeed, it confirms it. Thus, we need not dwell on this, as the history is well-established. But some facts need to be stated.

The earliest known reference to a people called “Israel” appears on the Merneptah Stele, dated to approximately 1207 BC, indicating that an identifiable Israelite population was already present in Canaan by the end of the Late Bronze Age. The Bible is, to be sure, part mythology. However, for the most part, it is historically accurate. Rather than resulting from a single military conquest, Israel’s emergence involved a combination of incoming groups, alongside gradual settlement in the central highlands and interaction with local Canaanite populations. These populations were the indigenous peoples of this land. They were assimilated and became Israelites.

As noted above, the Philistines arrived as part of the broader movements associated with the “Sea Peoples” (Phoenicia is another instance of a seafaring people who colonized the Levantine coast, north of the Philistine confederation). Compared with the largely village-based highland Israelites, the Philistines were more militarized and urbanized and appear to have possessed certain technological advantages, including early expertise in ironworking. Even with these advanced technologies, they could not in the end subdue the Israelites.

Biblical traditions portray repeated conflicts between the Philistines and the Israelite tribes during the period of the Judges. Philistine pressure on the highland tribes is often viewed as one of the major factors contributing to the eventual formation of an Israelite monarchy. Control of key trade routes and fertile lowland regions gave the Philistines considerable influence and made them a persistent challenge to Israelite autonomy. Under Saul, traditionally regarded as Israel’s first king, the tribes began to unite in response to external threats. His successor, David, is credited with achieving major victories over the Philistines, expanding Israelite influence, and establishing Jerusalem as the kingdom’s capital. Solomon further consolidated the state, constructing the Temple and presiding over a period of prosperity and stability. 

Following Solomon’s death, the united monarchy divided into the northern Kingdom of Israel and the southern Kingdom of Judah. These kingdoms, rooted in traditions tracing their ancestry to Abraham, developed distinct political histories while maintaining a shared cultural and religious identity. Over time, the Philistines declined as an independent power, eventually disappearing as a distinct people through assimilation, conquest, and the successive dominance of larger empires. Long before the Islamic conquest of Canaan, the Philistines had ceased to exist as a people, and Israel had become an established civilization.

The development of Arab identity belongs to a much later historical period. Arab peoples emerged in the Arabian Peninsula among both nomadic and settled Semitic-speaking tribes. References to “Arabs” appear in Assyrian and other Near Eastern records as early as the ninth and eighth centuries BC, typically describing tribal groups inhabiting desert regions. They are an ancient people. But they are not as ancient as the people we today know as the Jews.

* * *

In studying history, one must be mindful of the timeline. The identification of a people called Arabs occurred centuries after Israel and Judea had been established as kingdoms of the Jewish people. Moreover, the broader and more cohesive Arab ethnic and cultural identity we know today only occurred with the rise of Islam in the seventh century AD under Muhammad. It was during the early Islamic centuries that Arab identity became closely associated with the Arabic language, Islamic civilization, and the ruling elites of the rapidly expanding Muslim states. As Islamic rule spread across the Middle East and North Africa, many local populations adopted Arabic culture and language. These populations thus underwent varying degrees of Arabization, transforming Arab identity from a primarily tribal and regional designation into a much broader cultural and linguistic community. 

To summarize the timeline, the Philistines had disappeared as a people a millennium before the Muslim conquest of Canaan. Muslims would colonize that territory 1,500 years after Israel’s emergence. This reconstruction combines biblical tradition—accepting Abraham’s historicity for the narrative’s purpose—with archaeological and historical evidence. It presents Israel as a society that emerged largely within Canaan through a combination of local development and external influences, while highlighting the significant role played by groups such as the Aegean-derived Philistines to clarify who those people were. It clarifies that the formation of Arab identity represents a later phase in the long and complex history of the Near East.

* * *

It might be said that Palestinians are those people residing in Palestine, the name given to Judea by the Romans, as shown above. However, if one agrees to this convention, then that means that the Jews are the true Palestinians, since they subdued these lands long before the Arabs were even a people. The Arabs claiming to be Palestinians trace their origins to Semitic peoples living southeast of Israel, ending up in Canaan because of the history of Islamic conquest. One might object that, following from my argument that ghosts have no claim to land (The Ghosts of Conquest), having conquered that land, it belongs to the Arabs. But by the same token, having been reconquered by the Jews, the indigenous peoples of that territory, that land now belongs to the Jews. Therefore, the history I am telling—supported by archeology and historiography—must be relevant to those who appeal to it, and the truth of history falsifies their claim to the land. 

For its part, Israel is inclusive of Arabs living in its nation—but only if Arabs follow the laws of Israel. This is true of any nation that prioritizes survival. Many Arabs have signed on to the social contract and live and prosper in Israel. Those Arabs seeking the overthrow of Israel do not follow the law, obviously, and this makes them a threat to Israel’s existence. The Arabs have no organic justification for defying the law; they are not an indigenous population struggling against foreign colonizers. The pro-Palestinian frame inverts the logic of resistance. The Jews are not colonizers. They are native to this land. Obscurantists who say there are Jews descended from European populations—the Ashkenazi, Sephardic, etc.—know that those returning to their homeland in the Middle East carry the genetic heritage of Israel in their blood. Genetic studies find that Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and many other Jewish groups share substantial ancestry tracing back to ancient populations of the Levant. History records that Muslims once controlled the territory. This is not disputed. That same history records that Muslims lost the territory on the field of battle after having initiated a series of wars against the Jews in the twentieth century.

Considering this history, the two-state solution begins to appear nonsensical. Indeed, the scheme should be abandoned, and Israelis should consolidate the land now occupied by Muslims. Those who wish to become part of Israel can stay. But they must agree to follow Israel’s laws. Those who do not agree to the social contract have dozens of Muslim-majority Arab states in which they can dwell. Yes, I know that many of those states resist welcoming so-called Palestinians into their midst. One might ask why this is so. 

Arab governments have been reluctant to permanently resettle large numbers of Palestinians for a combination of reasons—demographic, economic, historical, and political, as well as a matter of national security. There are economic concerns—employment and the costs of education, healthcare, and housing. The common experience of Islamic terrorism is another. Chief among these, however, is that permanent resettlement could weaken claims that this is an Arab homeland and reduce pressure for a political resolution of the conflict. Many Arab governments maintain that the long-term solution should involve a political settlement that addresses Palestinian national aspirations. Thus, opposition to a greater Israel is about weakening Israel as a nation.

* * *

I titled this essay “The Myth of the Palestinian People.” This title needs clarification, so I am glad the reader made it this far. If by Palestinians, one means the Arabs who arrived in that territory long after the Romans renamed it Palestine, then the claim that the Palestinian people are the indigenous people of that land is a myth. Indeed, once one knows the true history of the territory, it is the Jews who are the native people of Palestine, since Palestine is simply the name the Romans gave the Jews to punish them for resisting Roman imperialism.

It follows that it is the Jews who are today resisting imperialism. No longer is the imperial force the Romans, who collapsed under the weight of empire. It is the Muslims, whose ambition to establish Islamic hegemony over the whole of the region—a new and terrible empire—targets the Jews for elimination one way or another (see The Danger of Missing the Point: Historical Analogies and the Israel-Gaza Conflict; Why the Israel-Gaza War Is Not Seen Like World War II—and What That Reveals About the Present Situation). Given this, the decent and good among Christians and Jews must join the resistance to thwart Islamic ambition. 

The antisemitic left and right in the West are on the wrong side of history (see The Enemies of Freedom; The Woke Reich and the Enemy Within; The Left-Far Right Convergence and Notes on the Fourth Political Theory). They have made their choice of comrades those who seek an end to both Christianity and Judaism, namely, the Muslims. They made that choice because of the ancient hatred of antisemitism—a hatred so powerful that it dispossesses its possessor of the capacity of reason and even self-reservation (see Jew-Hatred in the Arab-Muslim World: An Ancient and Persistent Hatred). So powerful is that ancient hatred that Christians have allied with the greatest threat to their religion, the very threat their forebearers took up swords to drive from the Holy Lands, the birthplace of both Christianity and Judaism (see A Cross of Suicidal Empathy: The Woke Emasculation of Christianity and the Road Back to Integrity; The Red-Green Ruse: Clerical Fascism in Post-Colonial Garb). 

If I were a Christian, there is only one term that would make intelligible the character of this development: Satanic. Yet it is the Jews whom antisemites perceive as Satanic. For the haters, the so-called “Epstein class” is a vast network of Jews and those they have corrupted who prey on children, even eat them (see The Dark Heart of Antisemitism: Separating the Haters from the Critics). This invention is but one facet of a grand cabal by Jews to run the world. How they do not see this as the work of the Great Deceiver, in which many of them believe with all their heart, testifies to the depths of their depravity. They have allowed their own construction of evil to devour them.

Swallowing the Black Pill? Towards a Sociology of Romantic Inequality

The term “incel,” short for “involuntary celibate,” refers to a subculture, largely consisting of heterosexual men, who perceive themselves as unable to secure romantic or sexual partners. Incel communities are characterized by misogynistic beliefs, hostility toward women, and narratives of sexual entitlement.

Have readers heard of the “black pill”? This is a belief that certain negative aspects of life—especially things like attractiveness, social status, or success—are fixed and unchangeable. It represents a deeply pessimistic, even fatalistic outlook, often concluding that effort won’t meaningfully improve outcomes.

The term is most commonly associated with parts of the “manosphere” and incel communities. It can also appear more broadly to describe any worldview that things are hopeless and cannot be improved. The manosphere and the broader mass sentiment of hopelessness and inevitability are part of the same social problem.

In sociology, a social problem is a behavior, condition, or situation that a significant number of people view as harmful or otherwise undesirable, and in need of change because it negatively affects individuals, groups, or society as a whole. Central to the change piece is explaining and understanding (in Max Weber’s sense of Verstehen) what lies behind the problem.

Social problems are not simply personal troubles. A man may be involuntarily celibate without joining a subculture that amplifies his grievance. Beneath a social problem are broader social causes, the consequences of which are at scale. Thus, sociologists study how cultural norms, inequalities, institutions, and social structures contribute to these problems.

Crucially, an explanation is not a justification. However, many perceive attempts to explain and understand a social problem as a defense of, and even support for, a problematic standpoint. Yet, in sociology, a standpoint is a person’s social position and lived experiences, which shape how they understand and interpret the world, which can be grasped without endorsement. How is one to address a social problem if one is deterred from explaining situations that underpin a given standpoint?

In this essay, I sketch the situation that gives rise to the incel subculture. I suggest an explanation that aids in understanding why young men are attracted to misogynistic beliefs, hostility toward women, and narratives of sexual entitlement. One may condemn the subculture, but without an explanation, it is difficult to address the problem. Understanding a worldview aids in explaining it. Worldviews are emergent from the intersection of natural and social history.

It is well understood that across culture and history, women prefer men with higher status, resources, or social standing. This creates competition among men for a smaller pool of desirable partners. This preference is an evolved tendency to seek partners who can provide access to resources, security, and stability. Status is not limited to social class or wealth; it also includes age, influence, prestige, and talent. Men may achieve attractiveness through a variety of pathways, not just good looks. Indeed, good looks don’t guarantee mate attainment. High income and prestige can make the average-looking man attractive to women.

In modern societies, women have greater access to economic and educational opportunities than in the past, allowing many to achieve high economic and social status independently. This complicates matters. It does not change the underlying tendency. Modern women prefer partners who are at least their equals in education, income, or occupational prestige. This creates challenges when highly educated or successful women seek partners who meet or exceed their own status level, particularly as traditional pathways for men to attain stable employment and social standing have weakened in some sectors of the economy.

Offshoring, mass immigration, and other developments have severely hampered men’s ability to achieve the status necessary to attract desirable mates. The declines in manufacturing jobs, reduced participation in civic institutions, and growing economic inequality converge to diminish opportunities for males to acquire the kinds of status valued in the mating market.

For this reason, the concept of hypergamy—the tendency to marry or partner up in status—is receiving renewed attention in the social media space. A decade ago, I would have been inclined to disregard the matter, but my politics have evolved, and it is becoming painfully clear that there is a problem. Women can marry upward, while fewer men can achieve high status. As a result, an increasing number of men are crowded out of the mating pool. This is the situation from which the manosphere arises.

Complicating this situation for young men is technological development. Social geographers have noted the phenomenon of time-space compression—the process by which advances in communication, information, and technology make interactions instantaneous and shrink distances. As technology advances, goods, money, and people move easily across time and space, including and especially virtually, making the world feel more interconnected and smaller. The number of potential interpersonal connections grows. In the past, women would settle for men in their community. The Internet has given them access to men beyond those confines, complicating the competition dynamic. Mate selection has thus shifted from local to regional and even global.

Reducing the worldview to essentialist notions reimagined by feminist politics, progressives not only mock those identified as incels, but also focus on this subculture to signal male threat. But the situation of young men is real, however odious the culture that has emerged from it. The internet allows men to find other men in their situation. The economic situation creates idle time to dwell on grievances that develop in an alienated state; technology allows those affected by macrosociological conditions to dwell on their situation together. This builds solidarity around a lay theory.

What is the evidence that the situation is real? Online dating data indicate that the female gaze is concentrated on a relatively small group of highly desirable men. No one reading this essay is oblivious to the fact that our lives are becoming ever more virtual. It is no longer the case that, for the most part, men meet women at clubs or house parties. Young men are abandoning social spaces where face-to-face interactions occur. Their economic situation makes it hard to have a social life. And social life itself has become less local. Thus, young men confront avenues that sharply restrict their opportunities to find suitable mates.

Given the situation, Jordan Peterson’s advice to young men to focus on improving aspects of their lives within their control before trying to change society or blaming external forces for their problems has limited utility. A man’s social situation matters, and achieving high status has become difficult amid globalization, the changing social structure, and new technologies. These facts have alienated many young men. Again, this is not an excuse but an explanation, and the situation is not entirely addressed by instructing young men to clear their rooms. (which they should, of course).

The natural history piece mustn’t be ignored. Gender roles are irreducible to culture. They are not social constructs. For men, sexual intimacy is less rooted in the transactional than it is for women. Males are driven by passion. In the past, humans built worlds around their essential nature. This provided social relations conducive to successful familial and communal life. Today, a world is being made that denies human essentialism. To be sure, social history matters. However, just as it is naïve to deny the relevance of social history, it is just as naïve to deny the relevance of the species-being. A world has emerged that is incompatible with male thriving.

Giving up on dating and marriage is associated with giving up in other areas of life. The situation strikes at the heart of self-actualization. We risk losing a generation of young men. Rebuilding the local community lies at the heart of the solution, but the obstacles to communal restoration presented by the social forces disrupting communities seem insurmountable. We know what is required: restoring pathways to status elevation by creating meaningful work and purpose; however, without a program of economic nationalism that blunts globalization, it’s hard to see how society restores these pathways.

Whatever the macrosociological challenges, understanding the dynamic helps us understand why we see so much frustration among young men in the West. This does not mean excusing misogynistic beliefs, hostility toward women, and narratives of sexual entitlement, but rather understanding the source of the standpoint to consider potential solutions to the problem. Established worldviews rooted in real conditions are resistant to ridicule, since the experiences associated with those conditions are acutely felt. Indeed, ridiculing such black pill subcultures risks confirming suspicions and hardening standpoints. Understanding worldviews does not mean validating them. It means specifying what underpins them and, if we can, changing those conditions. If we cannot change those conditions, it should not be from a lack of trying.

Image by Sora

The Project to Disorder America: More on the Problem of Immigrant Crime and Its Apologists

In August, 2024, in The Problem of Immigrant Crime and Its Apologists, I noted that one of the arguments that those defending mass immigration are fond of making is that immigrants commit less crime than the native-born. My central point in that essay was that, conceding the claim, if those immigrants weren’t in the United States, then there would be that much less crime. In late December of last year, John R. Lott Jr., president of the Crime Prevention Research Center, penned a piece in The New York Post reinforcing my point by examining the situation in New York. I want to amplify Lott’s findings in this essay and provide commentary.

The Elmira Correctional Facility—“The Hill”—in Elmira, New York.

Addressing the crowd that opposes deportations, wielding the claim that immigrants commit less crime than native-born Americans (illegal and legal immigrations are lumped together to create the ruse we’re supposed to take as relevant), Lott contends that recently released data from New York suggests otherwise, finding that illegal aliens are represented in the state’s prison and jail population at a rate significantly higher than their share of the overall population. In other words, the opposite is true: illegal immigrants are overrepresented in serious crime. Of course, illegal immigrants are already a crime, since they broke the law entering the United States without permission. Here we are talking about crimes committed after they illegally enter the country. (Many illegal aliens are criminals before they invade the nation.)

According to Department of Homeland Security data cited in the article, 7,113 undocumented immigrants are currently incarcerated in New York correctional facilities for offenses including aggravated assault, burglary, drug crimes, homicide, robbery, and sexual offenses. Lott also notes that thousands of illegal aliens with criminal records have been released because New York authorities did not honor federal immigration detainer requests. Why would New York and other blue cities refuse to cooperate with the federal government, that body that is charged with defending the nation’s borders and its internal security? I will answer that question in the conclusion of this essay.

Lott compares the estimated illegal alien population in New York—between 676,000 and 825,000 people, or roughly 3.4 percent to 4.15 percent of the state’s population—to their reported 14 percent share of the incarcerated population. Based on this comparison, Lott estimates that undocumented immigrants are overrepresented in New York’s correctional system by more than three times their population share. He further argues that this estimate may actually understate criminality among illegal aliens because some are deported before completing prison sentences or are removed before entering the prison system at all. Moreover, state policies that limit immigration enforcement in and around courthouses as factors affecting the available data.

Beyond crime rates, Lott argues that incarcerating undocumented immigrants places a substantial financial burden on taxpayers, estimating that annual incarceration costs in New York exceed a billion dollars. That is one city. Adding up the costs around the nation would likely find many billions of taxpayer dollars being spent on the illegal aliens in lockup. Deporting these criminals would free up billions of dollars that could be spent on education and infrastructure, reducing debt, or reducing taxes.

Lott cites federal data indicating that hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants in the United States have criminal records and links increased illegal immigration during the Biden administration to rising violent crime rates. He notes that immigration enforcement efforts under President Trump are contributing to declining crime rates, but as I have shown on this platform, progressives are fighting him all the way. (See also Crime, Immigration, and the Economy; What is the Relationship of Immigration to Crime?)

Returning to the question of why New York and other blue cities refuse to cooperate with the federal government, the answer is obvious. Democrats do not care about American citizens. The party led the way in ghettoizing blacks and offshoring the jobs of black and white workers. The public is not the party’s master, as it should be in a representative democratic republic. Their master is the globalist engineering the denationalization of the West.

Crime and disorder disorganize communities, disrupting culture and family, and corrupting the rule of law. What is beautiful is made ugly. Classical architecture becomes tacky, a canvas for graffiti, and a target for vandals. Brutalism prevails in its stead. Defining down deviance normalizes pathology and redirects the public to see those reclaiming the streets as reactionary. Over time, the native population is demoralized.

In this way, patriotism is delegitimized, and many patriots are shamed for demanding national integrity. This puts a chill in the air. Changing a country’s demographic composition disempowers the citizenry. It, moreover, provides bodies Democrats need for money and votes.

Securing political command of the nation for the project of managed decline requires a compliant political party, and Democrats are eager to perform that function.

The New Metaphysics: Notes On the Intellectual Origins of Unreason

George Orwell famously observed that some of the most absurd ideas in history originate among academics. Consider the belief, widespread among college teachers, and even many serious researchers, especially in the realm of medical science, that a man who says he is a woman is a woman. In his “Notes on Nationalism” (1945), Orwell writes, “One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool.” Although he was writing about a particular belief, the observation is generally true.

Orwell’s observation captures a recurring phenomenon: highly intelligent people possessing the unique ability to rationalize away common sense. Intellectuals, equipped with sophisticated language and conceptual tools, have acquired the capacity to replace a workable metaphysics grounded in observable reality—and therefore accessible to science—with an alternative framework that denies, undermines, and warps empirical inquiry. The contemporary paradigm of this tendency is gender identity doctrine.

As I have shown in essays on this platform, for centuries, “sex” and “gender” functioned as synonyms, entering the English language via different routes, both reflecting the straightforward biological reality of sexual dimorphism in humans. This dimorphism is among the most conserved and unambiguous features in mammalian biology: an organism is either male or female based on the type of gametes it produces, with rare disorders of sexual development representing developmental anomalies rather than a spectrum that dissolves the binary.

Academics, however, initiated a decisive separation. They first declared gender a social construct, independent of biological sex. From this premise, it followed that gender could be whatever an individual wishes it to be. Traditional gender roles and stereotypes were recast as oppressive, necessitating the rejection of the “gender binary” for authentic self-expression. Postmodernist terminology reframed gender as a “performance,” elevating subjective feeling above material reality.

This initial step quickly cascaded into a broader epistemological assault. If gender is culturally and historically relative—a social construct—then science itself becomes merely another belief system, equally contingent on time and place. The binary understanding of sex, rooted in Western scientific tradition, is dismissed as Eurocentric or patriarchal.

Consequently, human behavior is no longer interpreted through a biological foundation that establishes parameters for behavior and cognition, requiring analysis rooted in the incontrovertible. Instead, it is analyzed through a nihilistic lens in which all beliefs constitute projections of power. There are no rules save one: that there are no rules. The gender binary is thereby portrayed as an artifact of a patriarchal, heterosexist worldview that enforces hierarchies of oppressor and oppressed.

What emerges is a metaphysics that renders rigorous inquiry in biology and physics, as well as anthropology, psychology, and sociology, either impossible or “essentially contested” to the point of paralysis. In this space, science yields to ideology. An accessible metaphysics is replaced with an ideology that denies the very foundation of scientific inquiry. It thus represents a new metaphysics, one that is unreachable by reason and disconfirmation. Thus, the academic has become unreasonable. And not just the academic, but the public he has indoctrinated.

This substitution of metaphysics is vividly illustrated in personal narratives circulating among academics. Many describe initial skepticism toward gender identity theory dissolving after encountering a student who recounted their “journey.” A life of anxiety and depression was resolved only upon realizing they were “born in the wrong body,” followed by social transition and often medical interventions.

Such accounts mirror classic Christian conversion testimonials—“I once was lost, but now am found”—with the body as the site of redemption through hormones and surgery rather than spiritual transformation. This is not speculation. I had a fellow academic describe how a student’s conversion tale convinced him to subscribe to gender identity doctrine. It is a salvation cult.

The apparent parallel is instructive. Christianity, whatever one thinks of its metaphysical claims, has historically fostered a commitment to ethics emphasizing care for family and neighbors. As Max Weber noted in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), much of Enlightenment humanism represents the “blushing heir” of Reformation Christianity. Belief in a Christian ontology, or the ethical system derived from it, is associated with prosocial outcomes that align with observable human flourishing.

In contrast, the new ontology underlying gender identity ideology demands alienation from community and family, along with physiological alteration—cross-sex hormones, surgeries—to reveal one’s “true self.” Absent a grounding moral framework akin to Christianity, this ideology functions as a destructive pseudo-religion. It prioritizes subjective internal states over material reality, often with irreversible consequences for physical and psychological health, particularly among adolescents.

This dynamic helps explain broader cultural patterns, such as the surprising affinity some secular humanists and progressives express toward Islam. Despite surface-level incompatibilities regarding individual liberty, both frameworks can share an antipathy toward Western liberal traditions, a collectivist emphasis on group identity and power dynamics, and a willingness to subordinate empirical inquiry to doctrinal purity. From such a worldview, the reasonable becomes heretical and then is cast as an existential threat. Never mind that the threat is to the imaginary. The imaginary has become truth in the woke mind.

The academic embrace of gender identity doctrine thus exemplifies a deeper problem: the abdication of reason in favor of a metaphysics hostile to science and human nature. By severing concepts from their biological and natural-historical moorings, intellectuals do not liberate the individual but enmesh society in a metaphysics of confusion and harm.

Recovering a metaphysics that respects observable reality—biological sex as foundational, human psychology as embodied, and social relations as emergent, moreover morally adjudicable norms with ethics oriented toward verifiable flourishing—remains essential if we are to navigate the complexities of modernity without descending further into ideological fantasy.

Orwell’s warning endures because the academy retains its disproportionate influence over the stories societies tell about themselves. When those stories deny reality, the consequences extend far beyond the classroom.

Image by Grok

Iran, Israel, and the Possession of Nuclear Weapons

Several days ago, I wrote about the double standard regarding Jewish influence on US policy (see The Ghosts of Conquest). I noted in that article that critics on both the far left and far right invoke the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as though it were uniquely influential, while never objecting to the foreign lobbies that shape US policies.

Saudi Arabia spends vast sums cultivating defense partnerships, securing access to political elites, hiring lobbyists and public relations firms, and retaining Washington consultants. China’s influence is substantial as well, extending through business interests, corporate partnerships, supply chains, technology markets, academic collaborations, and research institutions—all of which shape political and policy decisions. I identified several other foreign lobbies.

In a pluralistic political system, influence is neither unique to nor monopolized by any single foreign interest group. Yet AIPAC is singled out for special criticism—and it is a domestic lobby. Why? It’s organized by Jews to advance the unique interests of the Jewish people.

Image by Sora

Yet another example of the double standard regarding Israel is the observation—prolific on X at present—that the international community is pretty certain (albeit this has not been officially confirmed) that the Jewish state has nuclear weapons. The objection goes up: why is Israel allowed to have nuclear weapons, but Israel and the United States are justified in preempting Iran from developing such terrible weapons?

Israel’s nuclear arsenal might be a problem if it were reasonable to believe that Israel would use nuclear weapons offensively. But since this is not a reasonable belief, why is it noteworthy? Iran is a different case. There should be no doubt in any rational person’s mind that a nuclear Iran would represent an existential threat to Israel and imperil the region and even Europe. European cities are now within reach of Iranian ballistic missiles. Such a threat also imperils the United States. US security depends on preventing dangerous countries from obtaining nuclear weapons. You have to be dangerously naïve to believe otherwise. Either that or pro-Iran—or anti-Israel.

I’m all for countries that possess nuclear weapons reducing or eliminating their arsenals, but singling out countries for criticism for possessing such weapons must concern the nature of the state in question, and whether there is a risk of offensive use. Is it reasonable to argue that Iran can have a nuclear weapon because France does? Of course not. France, for all its problems, is not (yet) an Islamic republic with designs to bring about the apocalypse. If France ever falls to Islam, those nuclear weapons become a real problem. Given the risks involved in triggering a nuclear war, it is not a problem that is easily solved. But given France as it is, it is hard to see that country using nuclear weapons offensively.

In addition to France, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and China are among the officially recognized nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I’m not happy with Russia and China having these weapons, but they do, and have for a long time. This makes military confrontation with these countries especially difficult—and dangerous.

That list does not exhaust the number of nuclear powers in the world. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have openly developed and tested nuclear weapons (outside the treaty framework). Why Pakistan (first nuclear test in 1998) and North Korea (first nuclear test in 2006) were allowed to acquire such weapons was an error of historic proportions. Especially in the case of North Korea, something should have been done. Entanglement with China made matters difficult. But, in the final analysis, inaction allowed it to happen. And the world is more dangerous now.

One reason belligerent countries seek terrible weapons is not only to annihilate their neighbors but also to raise the costs of military action against them. The prospect of a nuclear Iran is the strongest possible case for preemptive military intervention. Do it now before it’s too late. It’s already bad enough. The Islamic Republic has long-range ballistic missiles and has for decades organized proxy wars, especially against Israel.

Antisemites on the left and right object: “But the Ayatollah’s fatwa!” For those who don’t know about the fatwa, Ali Khamenei declared in the 1990s that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islamic law. Then why enrich uranium to yield weapons-grade fissile material? There’s only one reason: to possess a nuclear weapon.

Iranian officials have cited that fatwa since the early 2000s as evidence that Iran’s nuclear program is intended for civilian purposes rather than for building atomic bombs. Khamenei’s fatwa was referenced in statements to the International Atomic Energy Agency and became an important part of Iran’s diplomatic position during nuclear negotiations. However, its legal status, scope, and permanence are unclear because it was not initially issued as a widely published formal legal decree and could theoretically be revised by religious authority.

But should any of that matter? The question is whether the fatwa is relevant. The fatwa is a rhetorical tool, an official statement presented by a rogue regime as a binding constraint on nuclear weapons development to prevent international action. To believe the Islamic Republic’s claims requires either a profound ignorance of the character of the regime or tacit support for Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Why would those who claim to be America First trust any fatwa or believe it mattered?

* * *

The best arrangement for a tranquil world is a system of independent and sovereign states. However, state sovereignty depends on behavior and the capacity to use force. As for the latter, as the world’s hegemon, the United States’ military capabilities allow it to defend its sovereignty by force. However problematic the United States may become in the future, there is at the moment no other nation or coalition of nations that can bring it to heel. There’s a lesson in this: lesser states should never be allowed to possess awesome military capabilities.

States don’t have rights, but rather powers, and there must be some limiting principle on power. If this limiting principle is not internal and adequate to keep a state in line with international norms, then it must be imposed externally. Thus, as for the former, Iran is belligerent and has no internal or adequate principle to self-limit its power. It does not yet have the military capabilities to defend its sovereignty by force. It must never be allowed to develop those capabilities.

Disregarding the question of state character, those who defend Iranian behavior maintain that the United States cannot intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state because states have a right to sovereignty. Presuming that states have an inviolable right to sovereignty, they do not subscribe to the principle of limiting state power through external force.

Christopher Hitchens cogently argued that state sovereignty is not an absolute right but a privilege that can be forfeited through certain grave actions. A state loses its claim to sovereignty when it (1) engages in persistent aggression against neighboring countries or occupies their territory, (2) violates the spirit or letter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by pursuing prohibited weapons programs, (3) commits or enables genocide in violation of the Genocide Convention, or (4) provides sanctuary or support to international terrorists and similar non-state violent actors.

In Hitchens’s view, a regime that commits these offenses places itself “outside the law” of the international community, weakening the normal protections of sovereignty and justifying outside intervention. Iran has committed one or more of these offenses and has therefore forfeited its sovereign immunity from foreign action. 

Some states are sound members of the international community, and thus retain their sovereignty. Other states are anything but sound and have therefore lost theirs. Iran is a paradigm of the latter case. The argument that Iran’s nuclear program should be immune from external force is irrational.

* * *

Former Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene has been quite obsessed lately with Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons. Deploying a bizarre moral calculus, she uses the Israel case to suggest that preemptive war in Iran is wrong. Presuming a rational moral terrain, can one imagine Trump, the shoulders upon whom the task has fallen to protect the world from a belligerent regime, going down in history as the president who allowed Iran to obtain such terrible weapons? Sounds insane, doesn’t it? So why would these Blue Hat American Firsters criticize action preventing another nuclear state in Central Asia, especially one that chants “Death to America! Death to Israel!” and murders its own citizens? Because they are insane.

This is yet one more way antisemitism deranges people. I find it hard to believe that Greene and her ilk don’t want a nuclear-armed Iran, and the only reason I can see for this desire is that it makes the demise of the only Jewish state in the world more likely. What else explains why Greene would stand with Iran? Of all countries in the world, why would any good and decent person defend the worst regime on the planet? If Greene were genuinely American First, she would applaud Trump for finally doing something about Iran’s nuclear program.

Instead, she walks away from America First loudly. She elevates Joe Kent, a former US Army Special Forces warrant officer, CIA paramilitary officer, and Republican political figure who served more than two decades in military and counterterrorism roles. In the Trump administration, Kent served as acting chief of staff to the outgoing Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. He was later confirmed as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. In that role, he oversaw the integration of US counterterrorism intelligence agencies and served as a principal adviser on counterterrorism matters. For the antisemitic crowd, Kent’s credentials make his position a valid one.

Kent’s wife, Navy cryptologic technician Shannon Kent, was killed in a suicide bombing in Syria in 2019, so one would think he grasps the problem of Islamic terrorism for global tranquility. Yet, when he resigned as NCTC director in March 2026, he argued that Iran poses “no imminent threat” to the United States and said he could not support what he viewed as an unnecessary war.

His resignation letter maintained that the conflict departed from the non-interventionist, “America First” foreign policy he believed Donald Trump had previously championed. But Trump never said he would not intervene militarily to protect United States interests, and his actions during his first term made that abundantly clear. Knowing that the President was not shy about asserting US military prowess, why would Kent have joined the Trump administration?

Every time Greene and Kent talk about Israel, they expose their deep-seated loathing of Jews to the world. They claim they believe in national sovereignty, but they could not possibly believe this in principle, and the signaling out of Israel betrays the pretense. They believe in sovereignty only selectively—and only then based on ideology. There’s no principle in that. It’s just rhetoric disguising Jew-hatred. For them, “America First” is code for “Fuck Israel.” Did they believe Trump hated Jews, too?

I get it. I know how these people think. Jews don’t have the right to defend themselves because Jews are sinister. For these lunatics, world Jewry is a puppetmaster pulling the strings that animate the United States. It’s the old Jewish cabal theory. It’s a sick bunch—Tucker Carlson, Nick Fuentes, Candice Owens, and the rest.

The antisemites decry, “Why is Israel beyond criticism?” It’s not. All states are subject to criticism. Who doesn’t believe that? But singling out Israel for special criticism is a hallmark of antisemitism.

Antisemitism is often dressed in the rhetoric of anti-Zionism. “We’re not anti-Jewish. We’re anti-Zionist.” But what is Zionism? Zionism emerged in Europe in the 1800s as a response to widespread antisemitism and persecution of Jews. The main goal of the movement was to secure the Jewish homeland. This led to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, following the attempt to exterminate the Jews in Europe. Jews needed a restored Israel to be safe from the eliminationist sentiment that surrounds them.

Israel existed long before the resurrection of the Jewish state. As I explain in Anti-Zionism is Antisemitism (see the embedded links for a deeper dive), Jewish presence in the land that the Romans later called “Palestina” goes back more than 3,000 years. Zionism is, at its core, the fight for Israel as a Jewish state in the ancestral homeland of these people.

To be sure, when people tell you that they are not antisemitic but anti-Zionist, they may be speaking from ignorance. There are many ignorant people out on the streets chanting pro-Palestinian slogans. However rooted in ignorance, what guides them to this denial is an ancient antipathy towards the Jews. This antipathy is amplified by the convergence of far-right ideology and Islamophilia on the left. Third Worldism at the United Nations has infected that body with this ancient hatred. This makes the organization useful to those who one might expect to reject transnational authority.

The threat Jews face has been continual for millennia, and today it is reaching yet another fever pitch. Preventing Iran from possessing nuclear weapons is an imperative for Israel. But the threat of Islam is not just a problem for Jews. Islam threatens Western civilization, which is grounded in Jewish law and sensibilities. Christians, whose origins lie in the Jewish faith, whose ethical system is based on that ancient religion, should be involved in the struggle against Israel and the West.

Those Christians who turn their backs on Israel turn their back on their own religion. Jews and Christians must be a united front against Islam and the reactionary politics on the left and the right. Greene and her ilk claim to be Christians, yet they cast Israel and the Jewish people in the role of historical evil. That puts this bunch outside any decent moral order.

The Left-Far Right Convergence and Notes on the Fourth Political Theory

Image by Sora

The rational observer doesn’t need distinct lines of political thought to be working together in an explicit coalition for them to function as one. What is required is not formal coordination, but a shared concern or animating principle that anchors these otherwise separate forces. If different ideological movements are moving toward the same end, if they share an underlying antipathy towards something, they form what is effectively an implicit coalition. This is the phenomenon of convergence.

We can see this dynamic in what is often called the “red–green alliance.” Here, elements of the progressive left and Islamist movements form an affinity grouping. The red piece includes strands of anarchist, communist, and socialist thought that, at times, align tactically with jihadist movements. Here, what binds otherwise very different ideologies together is a shared hostility toward Jews. Antisemitism serves as a unifying thread.

A similar tendency appears on the right. There has been a noticeable development of antisemitic rhetoric alongside a more sympathetic stance toward Islam among some figures associated with the “America First” tendency, most notably Tucker Carlson, Meghan Kelly, and Candice Owens.

Influencers in this space have suggested that the left and right should find common ground based on shared grievances, including and especially hostility toward Jews. Many of these voices are Catholic. There is an obsession with Christian Zionism, not solely as part of Christian eschatology, but as an animal bred by the Jews. Nick Fuentes is exemplary of this tendency.

Nick Fuentes, far-right social influencer

Lately, the alignment of the far right and Islam has become more than convergence, with Christian antisemites taking to sharing on social media the postmodernist standpoint of Edward Said and critical race theory to make the case that the Jews are white settlers displacing Arabs they call “Palestinians.” (See History Matters, and On Matters of History, Israel Wins the Debate to understand the problem.)

Antisemitic sentiment has existed within segments of both the Catholic and Orthodox traditions over many centuries. With the Protestant Reformation, there emerged a shift in which aspects of what might be described as “Jewish sensibility”—a practical, this-worldly orientation—became more integrated into mainstream Christian thought in Europe. (See The Dark Heart of Antisemitism: Separating the Haters from the Critics.)

This shift helped create conditions in which capitalism could develop more broadly in Europe, no longer seen as exclusively associated with Jewish communities but as compatible with Christian ethics. Before this, the rationalism that came to prevail in Europe (interest, profit)—and then globally with world capitalism—was condemned for its Jewishness. The far right is open in its hostility to the Enlightenment. But it doesn’t realize that it is opposed to the rational foundation of capitalist relations. They would be quite comfortable standing with the monarchists on the right side of the French National Assembly. (I am not here denying the excesses on the left side of the French Revolution. But the Ancien Régime had to go.)

Karl Marx wrote about these themes in an early essay, “On the Jewish Question.” There, he developed an analysis of Judaism and economic life, where he framed “practical Judaism” in relation to “theoretical Christianity.” Later thinkers, such as Max Weber, in addition to his landmark The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, explored the idea of ancient Judaism as a bridge, or more accurately a pivot, between Eastern (Oriental) and Western (Occidental) traditions. From this perspective, the synthesis of religious and philosophical ideas that gave rise to Protestantism, in turn, contributed to the Enlightenment and liberalism—the intellectual and economic foundation of the modern West.

The ideas of liberalism, which represent a unified front against the irrationalism of communism, fascism, and Islam, emerge from this development. Before this, Christianity and Judaism were viewed as antithetical. The emerging reactionary coalition, combining elements of the left and right, pines for a return to anti-Jewish antipathy. It is atavistic in a most extreme way. Tragically, antisemitism has made significant inroads in popular culture. This nascent alliance threatens the future of freedom and reason in the West.

Batya Ungar-Sargon, who, like me, and for many of the same reasons, escaped from the left-wing warp of the twenty-first century, noted on X Saturday that Fuentes has now come out as a Democrat. He’s not alone, she observed. I, too, have noted this (a while ago, see The Woke Reich and the Enemy Within). “Many erstwhile Right-wing podcasters are now finding they have more in common with the Left these days, thanks to a meeting of minds on a singular issue: One’s level of comfort blaming Jews for the world’s ills,” she says in the clip shared above.

It is not just Fuentes switching loyalties. I am watching to see if Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene make the move next (Greene seems close to announcing her switch). They’re drawn to the left because antisemitism is manifest in Democratic Party politics.

In an interview with Maria Bartiromo over the weekend, House Democrat Ro Khanna advanced the conspiracy that Jews are the puppet masters. It’s not the rabble on the streets anymore. It’s the Democratic Party. This is an entailment of the Democrat strategy to use Muslims and other Third Worlders, whose Jew-hatred is notorious, for electoral advantage. They have to abandon Israel for their new constituency, namely the Muslims. Democrats believe there are enough self-loathing Jews to keep a toehold in that community. They’re right. Shockingly, Zohran Mamdani, the Shi’a Mayor of New York City, won the 2025 election with roughly 30 percent of the Jewish vote, according to exit polls.

* * *

What amalgamates disparate political tendencies is a shared hostility toward the West itself, often characterized as decadent. In this framing, decadence is linked to perceived Jewish manipulation of Western institutions and values. More than this, modernity itself is the work of Jewish operatives seeking to enslave the goyim. This narrative draws on much older patterns of thought, in which longstanding prejudices are repurposed in contemporary political contexts.

(Source of image)

A contemporary figure associated with the critique of the liberal West is Alexander Dugin, a Russian philosopher whose work has gained attention in far-right circles. Carlson interviewed the ideologue in Moscow in late April 2024 (Carlson also met and interviewed Vladimir Putin and traveled about Moscow, singing its praises). During the interview, Dugin—often described in Western media as “Putin’s brain”—railed against Western liberalism.

Like many on the left and the far right, Dugin argues that the modern liberal West is in a state of cultural and moral decay. It is, but not for the reasons he supposes. He positions his philosophy—sometimes called the “Fourth Political Theory”—as an alternative to communism, fascism, and liberalism. It is yet another attempt at a “Third Way.” He emphasizes a return to tradition, civilizational identity, and a multipolar world order in opposition to what he sees as Western universalism. This means he rejects human nature, seeing what people are in terms of what culture has made them. In effect, he advances a right-wing postmodernism wrapped in the language of premodern atavism.

What is the Western universalism Dugin and his followers oppose? One finds them in the founding documents of the American Republic—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights—as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in the post-WWII period (put aside the corruption of the UN and its Third Worldization for now). However much the reactionary right appeals to the ideas that founded the American Republic, they explicitly reject liberalism. Demanding the right of free speech, publishing, and assembly from this crowd is strategic, not principled. They are, in substance, illiberal.

A paradoxical feature of the illiberal attitude—the essence of authoritarianism—I am describing is the rhetorical conflation of liberalism and progressivism, a confusion engineered by the Democratic Party as part of its legitimation project. These terms are, in fact, opposites; the latter represents the ideology and practice of corporate statism.

Corporate statism is profoundly illiberal—and the goal is transnationalist. Thus, a contradiction emerges: the Red-Green alliance is organized by progressive forces. Since progressivism is diametrically opposed to liberalism, the reactionary right is pulled into the gravitational pull of the transnational project. This is paradoxical because the project is at the same time understood by the right as Jewish in character. Antisemitism deranges people.

I am opposed to the transnationalist project, too, but not because of any ethnic character. I oppose the project because of its goals: to reorganize the world as a neofeudalist global order in which the world proletariat is managed in techno-estates run by transnational corporations and financiers comprising a new aristocracy. The fact that Jews are overrepresented among elites does not signal an ethnic cabal to take over the world, but rather indicates a culture prone to material success, which reaches its zenith in Jewish practical life. Such a culture is not to be rejected, but emulated.

Dugin’s framework draws heavily on thinkers like Martin Heidegger, who joined the Nazi Party in 1933, the same year he became rector of the University of Freiburg (in his rectoral address, he aligned the university with the destiny of the German Volk and National Socialism), and on geopolitical theories associated with Eurasianism, a cultural and political doctrine arguing that Russia is neither fundamentally European nor Asian, but a distinct civilization with its own historical destiny, geopolitical sphere, and values.

Synthesizing these ideas, Dugin portrays the West, particularly the United States, as a force that erodes traditional cultures and imposes a homogenizing liberal ideology worldwide. In this sense, his critique resonates with both far-right and some far-left critiques of globalization, even though their underlying values differ significantly. How is this not the sister of European fascism?

* * *

I will return to Dugin in a moment, but I need to say something about the evolution of anti-globalization sentiment on the left—enough to make a new section. When I was in graduate school in the 1990s, the critique of political economy grasped the peril inherent in the transnationalist reorganization of the world, even if it did not appreciate its corrective, namely, economic nationalism (nationalism is a dirty word on the left). Regional and global financial and trade networks, such as the IMF, World Bank, the WTF, the EU, NAFTA, and GATT, were major targets of criticism.

Over the course of the twenty-first century, focus on these networks not only waned but street-level action came under the control of elites associated with transnational corporate power and world finance. Anti-Israel, anti-American, and anti-West sentiment came to the fore. This is in part due to postmodernist corruption, reflected in the rise of critical race theory, post-colonial studies, and queer theory, and tendencies with a substantial pro-Muslim bias (French philosopher and pedophilia advocate Michel Foucault is the exemplar). However, antisemitism was present in critical political economy circles before then, cloaked in criticisms of Israel, which was designated an apartheid and genocidal state.

Most notorious among those obsessed with the Jews and their supposed wickedness was James Petras, who taught for many years at Binghamton University and wrote extensively on imperialism, US foreign policy, and global capitalism. He became controversial for writings about pro-Israel lobbying and what he described as disproportionate Jewish influence in US politics and media, as if this were a bad thing. The work most associated with that controversy is The Power of Israel in the United States. In this book, Petras crossed from criticism of Israeli policy or lobbying networks into sweeping claims about “Jewish power” that echoed longstanding antisemitic narratives about covert ethnic control over world affairs.

Supporters, by contrast, argued Petras was analyzing organized political influence, similar to analyses of other lobbying groups. A similar rationalization is seen in the rehabilitation of Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer’s reputations in the wake of their book The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy. Walt and Mearsheimer were careful in distancing themselves from ethnic essentialism, whereas Petras’ work was highly reductive. Even those otherwise sympathetic to critiques of US foreign policy or Israeli state policy were compelled to distance themselves from his work. Too much, too soon. Walt and Mearsheimer gave the antipathy intellectual cover.

However, over the intervening years, Petras’ antisemitism has been mainstreamed. This view was introduced in a major way into the Democratic Party by former president Jimmy Carter in his 2006 book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, wherein he argued that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and construction of settlements constituted a system of apartheid. This sent progressives in search of other books leveling the same charge. There, they found the work of Noam Chomsky and Norm Finkelstein (who recently appears to regret what he helped start), as well as Ilan Pappé and Avi Shlaim, the so-called “New Historians.” They learned from them a falsehood: that Palestine was an Arab land and that Jews were interlopers—white settler colonists. The work of Edward Said provided the postcolonial theory that would lend intellectual heft to their antisemitic worldview.

* * *

Returning to Dugin, what makes his work significant is that he provides an intellectual vocabulary for civilizational opposition to the West. His “Fourth Political Theory” is explicitly anti-West. He argues that communism, fascism, and liberalism are products of the same Western modernity and should be replaced with something rooted in cultural particularism, religion, and tradition.

This stance is to be distinguished from my own nationalism, which emphasizes the universalism of reason and science. In my worldview, liberalism is not limited by cultural frames. Other moral systems are particular. Liberalism is universal. But for Dugin, all moral systems are particular; all knowledge is rooted in cultural systems and is thus relative, hence his advocacy of multipolarism. The parallels between his theory and postmodernism are unmistakable, and it is here that the left and right find common ground.

Thus, the elements of Dugin’s thinking create what may appear to the Western universalist as strange overlaps where very different groups share a common opposition to Western liberalism. Because liberalism and its universalism are treated as the primary enemy, groups that otherwise disagree can appear aligned in their opposition.

Dugin’s belief that modern society has lost its spiritual grounding resonates across ideological lines, especially among those who see modern culture as morally decadent and, crucially, irredeemable. Dugin interprets global politics as a struggle between “Atlanticism” (the US and its allies) and “Eurasianism” (a bloc led by Russia and aligned civilizations). This framing naturally encourages alliances of convenience among those opposed to US influence. This is how Fuentes can celebrate Stalin’s birthday.

Dugin is often portrayed as an ultranationalist. But ultranationalism is a widely misunderstood political worldview. Characteristic of regimes like Nazi Germany, ultranationalism is built upon the premise that one nation—often defined in ethnic or racial terms—possesses a unique superiority and historical destiny. This worldview does not aim to integrate nations into a shared global framework, but rather to elevate one above all others, at the expense of sovereignty.

Ultranationalism thus subverts nationalism and represents a form of globalism, one that parallels corporate statism. Indeed, the political-economic arrangements underpinning fascism are corporatist. Ultranationalism appears to be an internally contradictory ideology. Whatever its contradictions, it serves the interests of those who are reordering the world.

But the contradiction is important to interrogate. It arises because such regimes, despite appealing to nationalism, pursue aggressive expansion beyond their borders. Ultranationalists reject the interstate system. Under Adolf Hitler, for instance, the idea of Lebensraum justified territorial conquest across Europe. This expansionism was not an effort to create a cooperative or interconnected global order. Instead, it sought to impose a rigid hierarchy in which conquered peoples would be displaced, eliminated, or subordinated. The goal was not global integration, but world domination.

In this light, ultranationalism does not exactly represent a paradoxical form of globalism as we understand it, namely world capitalism in its corporatocratic phase, so much as a rejection of the international principle of national sovereignty, what is known as the Peace of Westphalia. Ultranationalism opposes liberal universalism. The modern state system rests on the idea that nations coexist as formally equal actors (albeit sovereignty is conditional on behavior). Ultranationalist ideologies explicitly deny this premise.

A more precise way to understand the dynamic, then, is to see ultranationalism as combining intense inward nationalism to mobilize its population, often ideologically rooted in palinogensis, with outward imperialism. Its ambitions may be global in scope, but they are not globalist in spirit, at least not in the way globalism is understood in mainstream political economic thought (whatever the problems with that). Rather than seeking a world of interconnected equals, it envisions a world reordered under the supremacy of a single idea—one that is authoritarian and illiberal.

* * *

Crucially, Dugin has publicly aligned himself with the traditions and symbolism of the Russian Orthodox Church and frames his political philosophy in explicitly religious and metaphysical terms. His broader ideology of “Eurasianism” draws heavily on Orthodox Christian ideas about civilization, spiritual destiny, and opposition to Western secularism. Antisemitic sentiment is inherent in this worldview.

Are readers familiar with the work of John Chrysostom (c. 347–407 CE), one of the most important figures in early Christianity, revered in Eastern Orthodoxy as a saint, theologian, and master preacher? Born in Antioch and trained in classical Greek rhetoric before turning to an ascetic Christian life, Chrysostom became a priest, gaining widespread recognition for his sermons, which emphasized moral reform and a rigorous Christian life. Later, he was appointed Archbishop of Constantinople, one of the most powerful positions in the Christian world at the time.

As archbishop, Chrysostom became known for his outspoken criticism of corruption and excess, both among the wealthy and within the Church hierarchy. This outspokenness made him powerful enemies, including members of the imperial court. His conflicts eventually led to his exile, and he died in hardship while being transported further into exile. After his death, however, his reputation grew, and he came to be honored as one of the great Church Fathers. The Divine Liturgy most commonly used in Eastern Orthodox churches today is traditionally attributed to him.

Those who follow him may admit that his legacy is complicated by a series of sermons known as Against the Jews, in which he harshly criticized Jewish religious practices and Christians who participated in them. If we are to recall Chrysostom, this ought to be our focus. These texts are widely regarded today as examples of early Christian anti-Jewish polemic and have been the subject of significant criticism.

Rationalizing Chrysostom’s antisemitism, his defenders will note that, like many figures from late antiquity, his life reflects both the theological achievements and the cultural conflicts of his time. Yet, the fact that Chrysostom stands as a towering and influential Orthodox figure, admired for his preaching and moral vision, his appeal to antisemites makes it impossible to ignore the centuries-long thread of antisemitism through time.

I note all this because the reader needs to understand that Catholicism is not the only Christian faith with a long history of antisemitism. This is not to say that all Catholics and Orthodox Christians are antisemites. It is to say: beware of Alexander Dugin and his Orthodox brethren.

* * *

To be sure, the secular left will never embrace Christianity. At the same time, to characterize the left as secular is problematic (see Genes, God, and Gender: Why Secular Societies Invent New Religions). The left will never embrace Christianity because it is seen as a feature of the decadent West. But wokism is a new religion, and it parallels more extreme religious legalisms of the past. Hence the lure of Islam.

Strands of Catholicism and Orthodoxy also share much with Islam. At their core is a common loathing of the Jews and the view that the West and its liberal values are decadent.

It is unlikely that there could ever be an explicit coalition of the left and the far right. Gender identity doctrine is a major obstacle. But it doesn’t matter in the final analysis. It only matters that both sides work against the West and the Enlightenment. That is reason enough to oppose what constitutes an effective alliance against freedom and reason.

Manly Arts at the White House

President Teddy Roosevelt routinely held boxing and Jiu-Jitsu matches at the White House. He even suffered a detached retina in a match at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, blinded in that eye for life. He was truly a Rough Rider. Roosevelt was hardly in a minority of fans of pugilistic sports. America has long had a love affair with the Sweet Science. At one time, boxing was America’s pastime, and young Americans have for decades learned the manly art of self-defense. It is a celebration of excellence and masculinity.

Caricature of Teddy Roosevelt, an avid fight fan

Donald Trump promised to host a UFC fight at the White House on the campaign trail. Having regained the White House in a landslide victory, he is delivering on his promise. He has incorporated a UFC night at the White House into the broader Freedom 250 platform—a spectacular, year-long celebration marking America’s 250th birthday. Can left-wingers not feign patriotism for even one year? No. They can’t. They hate America and its traditions. They hate whatever patriotic working people like.

Part of the left-wing hysteria is almost certainly a lament over the fact that Pride Month will not this June feature a White House festooned in Pride Progress colors and autogynephiles covorting about the grounds with silicone tits out. But it’s deeper than this. Indeed, the love of perversion is itself a manifestation of hatred for normality and tradition.

Trans activist Rose Montoya posted a video to social media partying with Biden at the White House Pride event

More deeply, the incessant postings on social media stem from a loathing of ordinary Americans who have long appreciated the martial arts. At the heart of progressive hysteria is a pathological aversion to masculinity and the natural fact that moral man is a physical being who affects outcomes through force and will. Long ago, Frederich Nietzsche told us what makes these people tick: ressentiment.

It is not for progressives that violence is a bad thing per se. Look at the violence on our streets. Violence for them is not merely acceptable but necessary. They call it “social justice.” Those who wish to bring down the social order believe they are the only ones who have a right to it. They abhor violence in competition under the rules of fair play—as long as it’s not men punching women in the face at the Olympics. They condemn violence that secures the national interests. They pursue violence out of envy for the successful and revulsion at the normal. They target those who believe in the good order that the American Republic promises.

Congenital snobs, progressives look at the preparations for UFC at the White House and see “white trash.” They see the rubble of the East Wing and would have you see them as incapable of grasping that building something better sometimes means tearing down something old. Yet, they themselves tear things down when it suits their fancy. Then they grow ugliness on the corpse of the once beautiful. They desecrate memorials and topple statues and stand on the ruins waving alien flags.

What is expressed here is a loathing of the spirit of the nation that those who despise it seek to overthrow. This is the way of progressivism. It takes nature and virtue and stands them on their heads to make an upside-down world that no decent person would want, then bequeath that world to the heirs of a post-rational world.

Anti-Zionism is Antisemitism

In History Matters, and On Matters of History, Israel Wins the Debate, The Dark Heart of Antisemitism, and several other essays on this platform, I have written at length about the right of Jews to a homeland and the incessant resistance to this right. Today, I want to dispel this notion that one can be anti-Zionist without being antisemitic.

Image by Sora

One of the more remarkable things about the Old Testament and Judaism is that it’s not so much focused on heaven as it is on the Jewish people and how they should conduct their affairs. It’s a practical religion. It’s not a religion based on salvation and transportation to an afterlife. It doesn’t promise the poor a good life in some other form. It promises the good life to everybody who is disciplined and watches out for his neighbor.

But it’s more than that. The Old Testament is the story of the establishment, conduct, and defense of the Jewish nation. The Old Testament is full of talk about nations. It isn’t an argument for converting everybody to Judaism and transforming the world. It’s about allowing people of different ethnicities to form a sovereign political state for themselves. Zionism is a political and national movement advocating for the self-determination of the Jewish people in their historic homeland. It’s rooted in Judaism. Jews are indigenous to the territory that the Romans renamed “Palestine” to punish the people for their struggle for national self-determination.

People like to tell you that their criticism is of Zionism, not the Jewish people. But Zionism is a modern-day representation of the goals that the Jews have sought going back thousands of years—and that they have a natural right to pursue. There is no substantive difference between them. Antisemites don’t get to dress up their anti-Jewish sentiment in the language of anti-Zionism and then claim they’re not anti-Jewish.

Man’s Moral Sentiments and Our Duty to Defend the Good Life

I’m an atheist. My ethics are rooted in natural history and in the tradition of natural rights that informed the American founding. I have written about this several times on this platform, and this won’t be my final word on the matter. We are celebrating this year the 250th anniversary of a nation founded on this idea. These ethics are not exclusively secular-humanist—nor do all those identifying as secular-humanist subscribe to them. Many Jews and Christians also live according to these ethics. Indeed, the authors of the Declaration of Independence were profoundly influenced by Christian ethics shaped by the rationalism and science that the Enlightenment elevated and promoted.

Writing the Declaration of Independence, 1776, by Jean Leon Gerome Ferris

The authors of the Declaration appealed not merely to human preferences or secular political arrangements, but to the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” as the source of certain unalienable rights. Whether one interprets Nature’s God in a traditional religious sense, as a rational Creator who established the order of the universe, or as the spirit of natural history, the essential claim is the same: human rights exist independently of the state and are not granted by governments. Governments may recognize or violate those rights, but they do not create them. The rational state exists to recognize and preserve the natural rights of man.

This conception of God is not one of constant intervention or miraculous acts. Rather, it is the God of reason, order, and natural law. Such a Creator established a universe governed by intelligible principles and endowed human beings with the capacity to understand them. The uncorrupted species-being of man projects these virtues naturally. We see this in the story of Israel. And that story is the story of any moral nation. Once forced out of Eden, man makes history. He makes history through hard work and sacrifice, and he does so shoulder to shoulder with his comrades.

God’s design is thus expressed through human agency. Men and women make history and act within it courageously, exercising judgment and reason, and in solidarity. Actions that advance and protect natural rights are good because they align with the moral order embedded in creation, i.e., the natural order. Means achieving those ends are informed by an ethics rooted in a moral ontology. Actions that suppress or violate those rights are bad because they conflict with that order. The ends and the means to reach them are objectively determinable.

Thus, morality is neither arbitrary nor merely the product of social convention. It is grounded in the realities of human nature and the conditions necessary for human flourishing. Rights are not preferences elevated by consensus, nor are they permissions or privileges granted by rulers. They arise from the nature of human beings themselves and therefore impose obligations on both governments and individuals. The measure of a society is the degree to which it secures and respects those rights and assigns duties to citizens to uphold a good society and to defeat those who would undermine it, on the field of battle if necessary.

When President John F. Kennedy said, “Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country,” he was appealing to the idea that a free society requires active participation, responsibility, and sacrifice from its citizens. The statement assumes that citizenship is not merely a claim upon benefits but a commitment to the common good.

Providence, in this (rational secular) understanding, is recognized not through supernatural signs but through the course of events after the fact. What was achieved? When justice prevails, when liberty advances, and when the rights of a people are preserved against oppression, one may see evidence of a larger moral order in his achievements.

This does not mean that every victory is divinely sanctioned or that history inevitably bends toward justice. As history shows, bad things happen when moral men fail to act or impose good on the world. Rather, it suggests that when free people act in accordance with reason and natural rights, they participate in a process that reflects the underlying order. Providence is not an interruption of nature; it is revealed through the success of human efforts that accord with the laws of nature and the rights and duties those laws imply. Man sees providence in his work—if he has the capacity to discern goodness. In this way, belief in natural rights provides a foundation for ethics that stands above both personal preference and political power. It offers a standard by which governments, institutions, and individuals may be judged.

I have written about this before, as well, but here the moral philosophy of Adam Smith must once more be noted. In his The Moral Sentiments of Man, Smith described what he called the “impartial spectator.” For Smith, inherent in human beings is the capacity to step outside their immediate passions and interests and view their conduct (and the conduct of others) through the eyes of a detached and unbiased observer. Man is not merely capable of sympathy. He is also capable of reason. Man is at once an emotional and rational animal. The impartial spectator serves as a guide to moral judgment, allowing individuals to evaluate whether their actions are just, honorable, and worthy of approval.

In a philosophy grounded in natural rights and reason, the impartial spectator is understood as the faculty by which human beings discern the moral order embedded in nature. It is through this exercise of reasoned self-examination that individuals align their conduct with justice, temper self-interest with concern for others, and contribute to a society founded upon liberty and mutual respect. For many men today, that capacity has been corrupted and deranged. In this year of America’s anniversary, we rededicate ourselves to rooting out corruption and overcoming derangement.

Whether one approaches this standard as an atheist, a Christian, a deist, a historian, or a philosopher, the central principle remains: human rights are inherent, objective, and worthy of defense because they arise from the very nature of humanity and the ordered universe we inhabit. If we are to save the American Republic and the West, we must regain this understanding of rights and obligations and commit the coming generations to it.