Democrats (selectively) gripe about the exercise of US military power abroad without a Congressional declaration of war. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 states that Congress has the sole authority to declare war. Under Article II, the President, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, can direct military operations without a formal Congressional declaration of war. The Executive has the authority to use military force to protect the homeland, including domestic deployment, and to achieve foreign policy objectives.
Whether one agrees with any particular actions, this power has been demonstrated repeatedly in US history—in Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Vietnam, and numerous other cases. Congress steps out of its lane when it usurps the Executive’s authority to direct military action, and demanding war-making may only proceed on a formal war declaration signals a failure to grasp the implications of such declarations.
The refrain goes like this: The United States Congress has not formally declared war since June 5, 1942, when it declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, the remaining European Axis powers with which the United States was technically at war based on the earlier declarations against Japan, on December 8, 1941, and on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. Yet the President has used the military without a formal declaration ever since.
For transparency’s sake, I am also guilty of repeating the refrain when criticizing a president for taking the nation to war, e.g., when George W. Bush invaded and occupied Iraq. I did not then recognize the significance of a Congressional declaration of war. Bush’s actions were detrimental to liberty enough with the passing of the PATRIOT Act. I now shudder when I contemplate the ramifications of a whole-of-society commitment to war with Bush and Dick Cheney in command.

In demanding Congressional declarations of war, the gripers never consider what happens to freedom when Congress declares war, as opposed to the President’s use of armed forces without a formal declaration. Without a declaration, the President may deploy military force without the concomitant restrictions on civil liberties associated with one. During police actions, except during domestic deployment, in cases of insurrection, and here the effects are localized, citizens are largely able to live as they normally do. By contrast, under conditions triggered by a formal declaration of war, the extraordinary power granted to the President often results in a totalitarian situation.
Consider what happened following the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Congress declared war on Japan the following day. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which authorized military commanders to establish exclusion zones, resulting in the forced removal and internment of approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans. Nearly 70,000 were American citizens. Many lost their homes, businesses, property, and personal freedom. The government justified these actions through appeals to military necessity and national security, and the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion policy in Korematsu v. United States (1944). However wrong Roosevelt’s actions are seen upon reflection, the internment of Japanese Americans was an entailment of total war.
In the documentary Manufacturing Consent, when asked about the legitimacy of such impositions, libertarian socialist Noam Chomsky responded that resorting to coercive control requires rational justification. He cites WWII as an example of when the deprivation of liberty is legitimate. He justified the wartime conditions even while noting that the United States consequently became something of a totalitarian state. Chomsky recognized that a declaration of war required a whole-of-society effort, and under these conditions, Americans cannot expect their lives to continue as they otherwise would. When a committed anarchist can find legitimacy in authoritarian control, this testifies to the ramifications of formal declarations of war.
Thus, the distinction between formal declaration of war and police action by presidents is important for reasons that extend beyond constitutional procedure. A state of war gives governments extraordinary justification to expand state authority over their citizens. It creates circumstances in which individual liberties, personal autonomy, and the ordinary expectations of citizenship may be subordinated to what the government identifies as the collective requirements of national security.
In this sense, war represents not merely a military undertaking but a fundamental alteration in the relationship between the individual and the state. Formal declarations of war should therefore be extraordinary—if freedom matters. At the same time, police action by a hegemonic power is rather routine. Freedom matters here, as well. The United States occupies a unique position in the world; it falls to the US to defend the imperative of world freedom. This requires defending the international system that underpins liberty in democratic societies. The extraordinary virtue inherent in the paradigm of Enlightenment’s fullest expression makes the US the world’s supreme moral authority, and the President is the only office in which the entire nation’s will is manifest.
Grasping the distinction between formal declarations of war and routine police action is thus paramount. Under ordinary circumstances, generally preserved during police action, individuals enjoy considerable autonomy within the constitutional framework. Government interference with personal liberty must be justified through established legal principles. Although never absolute, freedom of expression, association, movement, property ownership, and the pursuit of one’s livelihood are protected.
War introduces a competing consideration: the necessities of national survival. The government may then argue that individual interests must yield to collective objectives. Citizens may be conscripted into military service, subjected to restrictions on travel, required to surrender certain consumer choices through rationing, or compelled to accept government control over industrial production and the allocation of resources. Moreover, speech and political association can become subject to increased scrutiny when government considers them detrimental to military operations or national morale.
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The Constitution does not provide that declaring war automatically suspends civil liberties. Article I, Section 9, specifically addresses the suspension of habeas corpus, permitting it only in cases of rebellion or invasion when public safety may require it. However, notwithstanding the absence of a general constitutional provision authorizing the government to suspend the Bill of Rights under a formal declaration of war—indeed, because of the lack of any language preventing such things from happening—wartime conditions have repeatedly provided the political and institutional justification for extraordinary measures through congressional legislation, executive orders, military authority, and judicial interpretations.
American military policy has changed since 1942. This is the consequence of the United States becoming the world hegemon. Congress has authorized military action through resolutions rather than formal declarations of war. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 facilitated the expansion of American involvement in Vietnam. Following the September 11 attacks, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force in 2001, granting the president broad authority to pursue those responsible for the attacks and associated organizations. A subsequent authorization facilitated the invasion of Iraq in 2003. These authorizations give presidents considerable discretion over the scope and duration of military operations, but they did not result in the conditions Americans experienced during WWII, the PATRIOT Act notwithstanding.
The issue is larger than war itself, and this is what the gripers never bother to consider. What is at issue is the circumstances under which a government can demand that individuals surrender some measure of their freedom in pursuit of a collective objective. War makes that demand particularly compelling because it invokes the most fundamental responsibility of the state: protecting the nation and its people. But it also makes the defense of individual liberty particularly vulnerable, since opposition to extraordinary governmental measures can be characterized as opposition to the national interest itself. For the sake of domestic liberty, it is vital to defend the Executive’s prerogative with respect to military force.
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I conclude with a note about the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, often called the War Powers Act. The Act has been challenged because Congress, in attempting to restrict the president’s authority to deploy American military forces, unconstitutionally intrudes upon the President’s powers as Commander in Chief under Article II of the Constitution. Opponents, including President Nixon, argued that the 60-day withdrawal requirement improperly limits the president’s ability to direct military operations and effectively allows Congress to constrain executive authority without passing new legislation.
There is also a specific objection to Section 5(c), which allows Congress to direct the withdrawal of forces through a concurrent resolution without presenting it to the President for signature. Following the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, which invalidated legislative veto mechanisms that bypassed the constitutional requirements of bicameral passage and presidential presentment, this provision has been widely regarded as constitutionally suspect. The broader objection, however, is that the Constitution makes the President Commander in Chief and does not permit Congress to micromanage the exercise of that authority through a simple legislative resolution.
It may interest the reader to know, if he does not already know this, that the Supreme Court has not yet tested the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Congress thus manufactured an unresolved tension over which branch has the authority to deploy armed forces, and a particular party can use the Act to interfere with the President’s authority for political reasons. The irony is that the Democratic Party controlled both chambers of Congress when the War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973—the very party that supported Lyndon Johnson’s action in Vietnam. Nixon inherited that conflict. It is also worth noting that Democrats controlled the Senate when it passed the Iraq War authorization in October 2002. However, as I have pointed out on this plarform, the neo-conservatives aligned with the Democratic approach to foreign policy, which became obvious when Barack Obama carried forward Bush and Cheney’s plans for the Middle East.
