Islamist violence refers to acts of terrorism or extremism motivated by Islamist ideologies, such as those associated with groups like al-Qaeda, Hamas, or ISIS, which seek to impose strict interpretations of Islamic law on the world. This form of violence does not fit neatly into the traditional left-wing versus right-wing political spectrum as it is typically understood in Western political analysis. Instead, it is more accurately treated as a distinct category of religious or ideological extremism. But that has not stopped politicians from hiding it behind the rhetoric of right-wing terrorism, or left-wing activists from seeing in Muslims an ally in their struggle against the free and open society.
The analytical distinction exists because Islamism is grounded in theocratic objectives—establishing governance based on religious authority—rather than in secular political ideologies, such as ethnic nationalism, liberalism, or socialism. To be sure, Islamists suggest their struggle is ethnic when they accuse their opponents of “Islamophobia.” That construction is something of a self-reveal, however, since it inadvertently invites the public to see Islam as an ideology, not an ethnicity. Apparently aware of this, more recently, propagandists have increasingly substituted “anti-Muslim” for Islamophobia. But the swap doesn’t work well—at least for those whose brains are in gear. A Muslim is an adherent to the Islamic faith.
Perhaps applying conventional left-right labels to Islam obscures more than it clarifies. Islamism shares characteristics with far-right ideologies: strong emphasis on authoritarian governance, moral conservatism, opposition to secular liberal values such as gay rights, gender equality, pluralism, and demand for traditional social hierarchies. Islam’s promotion of patriarchal structures and rejection of modern liberal norms does resemble far-right conservatism. To be sure, left-wing ideologies can be authoritarian, and often are, but they do not, for the most part, contain the same content as Islamism.
Some commentators have assumed that Islamist violence is grouped under “right-wing extremism.” In the wake of the Bondi Beach massacre, Australia’s prime minister, Anthony Albanese, recently made statements regarding the rise of right-wing extremism as a security threat in Australia. Although this is a rhetorical claim rather than a standard or widely accepted academic practice, it arguably follows from what I described above. Of course, Albanese’s motive is to marginalise populist-nationalist forces on the move across the world, decried as far-right-wing actors.
Islamism has, at times, intersected tactically with left-wing themes, particularly through shared opposition to capitalism and Western imperialism. We saw this in Iran during the Islamic revolution in the late 1970s—with disastrous results. As we saw in the Iranian case, these overlaps are pragmatic rather than ideological and do not reflect a genuine alignment with left-wing political theory. Moreover, the virulent antisemitism associated with Islamist terrorism is shared by left and right-wing ideologies beyond the Islamic space. I have written extensively on the rise of antisemitism among left-wing Activists in the West. More recently, a strange affinity with Islam has emerged in the antisemitism expressed by prominent voices on the Christian right, for example, Tucker Carlson, Nick Fuentes, and Candice Owens.
I will leave the matter of right-wing antisemitism to a future essay and focus on the Red-Green affinity for the balance of this essay. Red ideology is characterized by atheistic materialism, class struggle, and opposition to capitalism (while embracing corporatism), while Green ideology emphasizes the embrace of theocratic rule and opposition to secularism. Despite their ideological contradictions, both share a common objective: challenging Western cultural, economic, and political dominance. This is often framed through narratives of “oppressors” versus “the oppressed,” with conflicts such as Israel–Palestine portrayed as examples of “white settler colonialism.”
We see the alliance most concretely in communist and socialist groups supporting the Palestinian “resistance” movement, Islamist leaders—such as Iran’s ayatollahs—employing anti-US and anti-capitalist rhetoric that resonates with leftist audiences (Michel Foucault was a fan), and instances in urban Western politics where leftwing Muslims have attained leadership roles, Zohran Mandami of New York and Sadiq Khan of London being the most obvious examples. Together, these examples are illustrative of how ideological cooperation can occur despite big philosophical differences. The glue holding the coalition together: loathing of Jews, liberalism, and whiteness.
Tactically, leftist movements have historically relied on cultural Marxist and postmodernist discourse, disruptive protests, and identity politics, while Islamist movements prioritize jihad and the mobilization of the religious ummah. In the Red-Green alliance, these approaches converge in coordinated activism against shared enemies—such as “imperialism,” or “Zionism”—employing multicultural and identity-based frameworks to promote mutually reinforcing objectives.
Critics of the left (including some on the left) argue that leftist actors are naĂŻve about the long-term goals of Islamist movements, particularly the risk of Islamist dominance after revolutionary success. They warn that Islamist groups and leaders strategically exploit leftist platforms and institutions to pursue broader objectives, foremost among them establishing a global caliphate. Historically, this alliance is temporary, with leftist groups marginalized or eliminated once Islamist factions consolidate power, as cited in examples like the post-revolutionary purges in Iran.
In the study of political violence, Islamist attacks are frequently analyzed as a separate category, in part because of their unique motivations and, in many cases, their comparatively high lethality on a global scale. While forcing Islamist violence into a simple left-right framework oversimplifies its religious foundation and ideological distinctiveness, Islam’s presence in leftwing politics is a concrete reality. We see the alliance of anarchists, communists, socialists, and Islamists not because the former agree with everything Islamists believe, but rather share with Islamists a loathing of the Enlightenment and liberalism. Both Red and Green sides seek to replace the free and open society with a totalitarian order.
Is the Red-Green Alliance ideologically coherent? In terms of objectives, yes. That one finds it odd that left-wing actors work alongside an ideology that would, in the end, subjugate them and exterminate some among them is rather beside the point. To be sure, slogans such as “Queers for Palestine” are opportunities to point out the contradiction. However, characterizing Islam as right-wing extremism obscures the triple threat to Western civilization, the third threat being the corporate state project operating the Red-Green alliance. While we make explicit the contradictions, we also need to expose the reason why so much energy is spent glossing over them.
freedom and reason 