Today, I explore the case of a transgender male who was the victim of a mob attack planned via Snapchat by a group of his peers in Harrow, a large town in London, England. Many believe that this case provides a real-world instantiation of a form of bigotry transactivists label “transphobia,” defined as an irrational fear, hatred, or loathing of trans identifying individuals. The definition also often includes criticism of the ideology that affirms the existence of gender identity, exalting that identity to a status that effectively holds trans identifying individuals blameless for their harmful actions. The claim made by gender critical voices that the victim in this case is also a perpetrator is thus construed by transactivists as an example of victim blaming.
As such, the Harrow case is useful to elaborating points made in an essay I recently penned, Blame, Fault, and Victimology, in which I distinguish between victimology, a subfield in the discipline of criminology, and the practice of blaming the victim. Victimologists study the legal, psychological, and social impacts of crime on victims, as well as their interactions with the criminal justice system and societal responses. Moreover, victimology provides knowledge to the public useful for avoiding victimization. Victim blaming feels self-explanatory, but the matter is a bit more complex that it might seem at first blush; I detail the practice in that essay. I spend several thousand words on the matter there, so I won’t repeat those details here.
I am moved to write about this today because of a controversy on X (formerly Twitter) in which critics of gender ideology express concern that mainstream media reporting on the Harrow story skirts the problem of “sex by deception,” a crime I detail in the course of the present essay. For background on the X controversy, see the tweets threads below, one by Amy Souza, the other by Helen Joyce, both identified as gender critical voices and smeared by transactivists as “TERFS,” an acronym for “trans-exclusionary radical feminists.” These two (and many others) are routinely smeared as transphobic by the gender ideology contingent. I will first report the details of the case and then think aloud through the problem Souza and Joyce identify.
The 18-year-old victim in this case was lured to a meeting under the pretense of roller disco, where he was ambushed, pinned to the ground, and stabbed fourteen times. The victim survived the attack. The assault followed a revelation that he was transgender, portraying a woman and concealing his true gender. Four youths have been convicted for the premeditated attack. One, a female Summer Betts-Ramsey, received an eight and a half-year sentence in youth detention (four and a half years mandatory), three others, Bradley Harris, Camron Osei, and Shiloh Hindes, received three-year sentences, while a 17-year-old boy, whose name is protected because of juvenile status, received a youth rehabilitation order.
The media framing assumes the trans activist narrative that this was a “transphobic attack.” Concerning motivation, the Mirror reports that the court heard the man was with one of the defendants, Harris, at his house in January last year. While there, a mutual friend called the defendant to tell him that the man he was with was “trans.” Excusing his deception, the prosecutor told the court, “Having been attacked in the past because of her transgender identity, she denied it.” The two then kissed, and the trans identifying male performed oral sex on the defendant. Soon afterwards, another friend told Harris that the individual was a “tranny.” The trans identifying male denied it again, at which point Harris picked up a knife and said, “I’ll stab you if you lie.” The trans identifying male says he felt intimidated and admitted to being transgender. Harris told him to leave.
When Harris told the group that the man had deceived him in order to have sex with him, the Snapchat group turned on the trans identifying man, with one of the other defendants threatening to stab the trans identifying male. When the trans identifying male asked the group when they would next be meeting, Harris responded: “[I’m] not your mate… you tranny.” Phone evidence presented in court revealed that during a call Summer Betts-Ramsey told a gang member: “I have to go to Harrow to beat up some… a fucking tranny bro.”
I am determined to address the controversy without denying the wrongfulness of what the defendants did, or the appropriateness of the justice served. So I want to put the matter as definitively as I can: what the mob did was wrong and the sentences were appropriate. Whatever happened before the mob attack cannot justify that attack. However, what the stories about this case leave out or obscure, and this is the point Souza and Joyce with to raise, is the crime perpetrated by the trans identifying man, a crime that goes by different names, but most accurately sex by deception. Alluding to this crime, the Guardian characterizes the situation as “a distorted notion of revenge.” To get the totality of the matter on the table, I will explain the crime of sex by deception and then provide an hypothetical case hoping the reader will grasp the significance of it, as it has broader implications. I will also explore real-world cases that might serve as analogs for thinking through such matters.
Sex by deception, sometimes called “sexual fraud,“ occurs when one person misleads or manipulates another into engaging in sexual activity by providing false information or concealing the truth. This deception can take various forms, including pretending to be someone else, hiding important facts about one’s identity, and lying about the nature of the relationship or intentions. In the Harrow case, the three forms identified apply. It also should also be noted that sex by deception often involves manipulating emotional or psychological vulnerabilities to gain consent. It is unclear whether these elements apply. What seems likely is that sex by deception was at least one of the motivating factors for Harris, whose status as a victim of this crime in not in dispute.
The key element in sex by deception is that consent is given under false pretenses, i.e., the person agreeing to the sexual act would have made a different decision had they known the truth. This form of deception can lead to serious emotional harm, physical violation, and sometimes legal consequences, as it undermines the principle of informed consent in sexual relationships. It’s a breach of personal autonomy and respect for others, leading to the exploitation of the victim’s trust. To be sure, the man who was deceived in this case should have sought out law enforcement and reported the incident instead of participating in mob violence. But the reason he was moved to perpetrate this crime may not be solely explained by antipathy towards trans identifying people. Perhaps antipathy towards trans identifying individuals is a bit clearer in Betts-Ramsey’s statements, but in Harris’ case, evidence that he would have committed violence against this group apart from the deception he suffered is lacking.
To make this relevant to my US readers, sex by deception is illegal in certain situations within the United States, although the legal landscape varies depending on jurisdiction. In some states, sex by deception may be classified as a form of sexual assault, even rape. In other cases, it’s classified as fraud. Either way, it rises to these levels if the deception involves concealing one’s identity, pretending to have a different status, or providing false information about the nature of the act itself. The most common legal concept tied to sex by deception in the US is “rape by fraud” or “sexual assault by fraud.” In cases where deception impacts the consent given, the consent given is invalid.
In England, which shares many of the same foundational legal assumptions with the US, sex by deception is also considered illegal under certain circumstances. If consent is obtained through deception, it may be deemed invalid. On these grounds, the act can be classified under the offense of rape or sexual assault, particularly if the deception undermines the person’s ability to give true and informed consent. This is clarified under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, where consent is defined as the agreement to engage in sexual activity, given voluntarily and with full knowledge of the situation. If one person lies about his identity, and the other person consents based on those lies, the validity of consent given is problematic. An important question in the Harrow case is why the victim in the case has not also been charged with a crime.
I interpret Souza and Joyce’s criticisms to speak to a larger issue—that the act of omitting or obscuring the fact of sex by deception in these stories amplifies the framing of the attack as transphobic and thus serves propagandistic ends. Indeed, the construct “transphobia” is a propaganda term—its functions the same as the construct “Islamophobia”—designed to suggest the presence of a state of mind akin to a mental disorder or a species of discrimination. To the extent that we accept the legitimacy of such terms, the language used by the attackers could be construed as such if the common slang “tranny” is seen as an indicator. At the same time, why is it obvious that any revulsion a straight man feels over same-sex acts is irrational and not natural—as natural as a gay man’s revulsion at having sex with a female? If it’s not, then doesn’t a victims reaction to having been deceived into having constitutes another motive? Furthermore, doesn’t failure to acknowledge the role this played in the crime obscures that motive?
I shared above the two clips of atheist, humanist, and secularist Christopher Hitchens speaking about the consequences of elevating an ideology to an exalted position and enjoying the power of the state behind its propagation to convey the greater problem ideology poses. It is the situation Hitchens describes that redefines words as, and transforms criticisms of an ideology into acts of bigotry, which are then blamed for violence against those who subscribe to the ideology. The devotees of the ideology, on the other hand, are held blameless for their harmful actions, or at least the harm of their acts is diminished. Moreover, the harm caused by their actions is blamed on the victims. We saw this in the Charlie Hebdo case, in which it was at least insinuated that the destruction of property and acts of violence perpetrated against cartoonists in Paris, France with a history of ridiculing Islam and its prophet were provoked by cartoons. With this move, perpetrators are transformed into victims.
We are seeing it again in the characterization of reporting on decades of systematic rape of British girls by Muslims, concealed all that time by the British government, as anti-Muslim bigotry, here through the euphemism of being “overly descriptive”:
The reason for such obscurantism seems obvious in that, for some, it suggests that the victim is to blame for mob violent, that having committed a crime himself gives tacit approval to the mob’s actions. It is an example of victim blaming. To be sure, sex by deception in this case does not justify the actions of the mob. As I have plainly stated in this essay, and in the one I cited at top concerning the matter generally, what the attackers did is criminal and they deserve having had the book thrown at them. At the same time, I cannot say that the act of raising awareness of the crime of sex by deception is of no significance here. If we are to fight this type of crime, speaking here of sexual fraud, the risk of which is heightened by the deception inherent in the conditions established by gender ideology, the matter should have been included in the story—and the perpetrated held to account whatever the actions of the rape victim.
I say this not only to raise the possibility that antipathy towards trans identifying individuals as a “community” (to borrow Hitchens’ observation) may not have provided the motive for each of those involved, which would be fair to Harris, but for the general purposes of raising consciousness about the act that likely motivated his actions. Consider the example of interracial crime. Black Americans are many times more likely to victimize whites than the other way around. Are black Americans motivated to victimize whites because of racial antipathy towards the white race? After all, the problems of black Americans are routinely blamed on the white majority. Yet one will be hard pressed to find in reporting on this matter any suggestion that this was the motivation. On the other hand, when a black American is victimized by a white man, the thought appears in many minds that the action was racially-motivated. A look at the demographics of hate crime statistics indicates that such perceptions are the official ones, as well. However, a violent act perpetrated by either a black man or a white man may have other motives in back of it; but the stats will how that white men are overrepresented in hate crimes. More than this, the criminal actions of black Americans is blamed on white Americans at large—or at least understand in terms of the suffering of blacks in America.
I ask the reader to imagine a case in which a lesbian becomes intimate with a man pretending to be a woman without the lesbian being aware that the man is a woman. It doesn’t matter whether the man sincerely believes he is what he is pretending to be. Objectively, it cannot be true that the man is the other sex. I do not know for sure if there is no god but Allah or that Muhammad is his messenger, but I do know for sure that a man cannot be a lesbian no matter what he thinks of himself. And since there is no objective way of determining whether he sincerely believes he is what he cannot be, nor do we need to bother with determining this, the only pertinent matter before us is what he is. Objectively, then, what has occurred in hypothetical scenario is rape, since the lesbian did not consent to having sex with the man. To be sure, a woman who prefers women may consent to having sex with a trans identifying male, but in the hypothetical, which parallels the actual case reported in the British press, the consent given is not valid since the woman did not consent to having sex with a man. The victim in the Harrow case is a heterosexual man who was tricked into engaging in a homosexual act. Harris is a rape victim. Yet, to my knowledge, no charges have been filed.
I have written about the problem of deception inherent in conditions established by gender ideology in several essays. In The Queer Project and the Practice of Deceptive Mimicry, I argue that, whenever used to make a false impression, costume and performance are acts of deceptive mimicry. Gender ideology is founded on lies, and the demand is that we not only deny the lies, but that we participate in them. “Deceptive mimicry in the human species almost always result in bad simulation; despite his best efforts, a man rarely passes as a woman. Most men can see what he really is. Even more women can see through the deception. The man engaged in deceptive mimicry has trouble convincing himself that he is the thing he says or wants to be, demanding others participate in the simulation by referring to him using feminine pronouns and chanting obvious falsehoods like ‘trans women are women.’” The “almost always” is important here. In a few cases the simulation is convincing, but in many others it is made so by years of disordering the innate gender detection faculty common to our species. The demand is that this cannot be deception because the person is the gender he says he is. This demand denies science and asks us to lie for the sake of an ideology.
This lie has been institutionalized in common practice. In the essay Is this Dating Site Encouraging Deception and Fraud? I report that Grindr doesn’t allow gay men and lesbians to filter for “cisgender,” i.e., a neologism capturing those whose identity matches the objective reality of their gender (really a propaganda term designed to make equivalent the normal with the pathological). In doing so, Grindr perpetuates the falsehood that trans identifying individuals are the gender they claim they are. I pose the matter rhetorically in the essay: “Is this company engaged in deceptive practices that put personal security at risk by obscuring reality?” In a word: yes. Grindr is giving cover to deceptive mimicry by covering criminal fraud in the language of anti-discrimination. I go on to explain that “[h]umans are mammals and, as such, natural beings with a natural history. A man who appears as a woman, no matter how sophisticated the simulation is, is still a simulation of a woman. No simulated appearance can change the reality the appearance seeks to obscure. So when a trans identifying man claims to be a woman he is engaged in deception.”
I used the hypothetical of the case involving a lesbian in that essay, as well, noting the problem of a man producing a simulated sexual identity not having to tell lesbians the truth about what and who he is—a heterosexual man. As a libertarian on sexual matters, i.e., tolerating the freedom of consenting adults to engage in sexual relations, I emphasize that there is nothing to do about valid consensual intimacy. I write, “If a man seeks intimate experiences with other men simulating women (or any other being or object), then this is something no government should regulate. In a free country, men are allowed to appear as women, and other men are allowed to seek intimacy with them, etc.” A man may also believe he is a prophet of Allah, etc. If a man desires other men who imagine themselves as such, either a woman or a prophet, I have no desire to prevent sex between them. “But such intercourse must be voluntary and consensual,” I write. “If a man lures a heterosexual man or a lesbian on a date posing as a woman, this should carry criminal penalties; it is, at bare minimum, fraud; if intimate contact occurs, rape or sexual assault.”
I conclude that February 2024 essay with this: “Why this isn’t obvious with rules rendered in black letter law everywhere is Exhibit A in the success of the progressive war on justice, rights, science, and truth. It’s a signal that we’re in the grip of a new religion, one that, because the government stands behind it, has become the official dogma—the state religion.” That is why the Harrow case is significant, and the deeper reason I think Souza and Joyce have raised the matter. Their argument, as I understand it, is that the act of omission by the media in fully reporting this story feeds the narrative that deceptive mimicry is no problem at all, as least when perpetrated by a trans identifying individuals, that the victim in this case did not commit a crime himself, that the sole motive was antipathy towards trans identifying individuals, and, more broadly, that critics of gender ideology are to blame for that antipathy. But, as Joyce pointed out, two things can be true simultaneously. The victim of the beating in Harrow did commit a crime, and this fact is central to the problem of gender identity and trans identification.
To once more reference the problem of Islamic groomer gangs, suppose one of the thousands of British girls victimized by Muslim men, or a group of her friends or a family members, engage in “a distorted notion of revenge”? That goes to motive. To say it is only the work of anti-Muslim antipathy obscures the real motive. The media works very hard to obscure motive in this case, portraying protests or retaliatory actions as the work of “far-right groups.” But protests or retaliatory actions often emerge from genuine outrage over injustice and the perceived failures of authorities to protect victims or hold perpetrators accountable. While some organized responses may involve groups with specific political agendas, attributing all anger or actions to such groups obscures the real motivations of victims, their families, and ordinary people who feel deeply impacted by these events. Anger and calls for justice—and even retaliatory action—are natural responses to grievous harm, and they often transcend ideological or political labels. Acknowledging nuance is essential to addressing the root causes of such crimes and restoring trust in the systems meant to protect society.
These matters are complex, and solving them requires taking the totality of the situation under consideration. When I teach juvenile delinquency, I ask students to consider the circumstances of the Columbine High School shooting. I tell them that the shooters Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold were driven by a deep sense of anger and resentment stemming from a range of grievances that they articulated in journals and videos. It was clear from those materials and other information that the boys felt profoundly alienated and isolated, perceiving themselves as outcasts in their school community. Both harbored a particular hatred toward what they saw as the dominant social groups, especially athletes and “popular” students, whom they viewed as representative of a society that had marginalized and rejected them. Both individuals felt a desire to assert power and control, using violence to make a statement about their perceived grievances. The Columbine attack emerged from a toxic combination of personal alienation, societal resentment, and a deep-seated desire for vengeance.
None of that justified their actions. Harris and Klebold are responsible for what they did. I raise this and the Harrow case—and one more before I am through—not to blame victims. I talk about motivations to provide a more complete explanation for why people perpetrate such acts so that those in a position to ensure the safety of others can take steps to do so. It’s clear from the evidence that Harris and Klebold’s motives were far more complex and rooted in a combination of psychological issues, personal insecurities, and a broader hatred of society. Framing the Columbine attack purely as a reaction to bullying oversimplifies the intricate web of factors that led to their actions. At the same time, bullying is a problem in society, and failure of those in authority to intervene in such cases leaves some of those who suffer it (thankfully, a small minority) to feel justified in taking matters into their own hand.
In the case I am reporting in this essay, Bradley Harris may have felt that he would not go to the authorities and report the rape he experienced at the hands of the trans identifying male for the same reason that the victims of Britain’s groomer gangs were reluctant to report their victimization to the police. One of the scandals in the groomer gang controversy is the existence of documented instances where police and local authorities failed to respond adequately to concerns raised by victims and their families about grooming and sexual abuse. For example, the Jay Report on Rotherham (2014) exposed a pattern of systemic neglect, where authorities dismissed or ignored complaints despite overwhelming evidence of exploitation. A significant factor was fear of being accused of racism or damaging community relations. Moreover, there was found a tendency to underestimate victims, many of whom came from disadvantaged or troubled backgrounds and were unfairly judged as complicit or unreliable. A culture of indifference within law enforcement and child protection services allowed this exploitation to persist for years, leaving victims without the support or justice they deserved.
Perhaps feeling that there was no receptive authority to handle such a case, Harris may have taken matters into his own hands. I reject this justification, just as I reject as justified the actions taken against the Muslim minority in the UK in retaliation of the systematic rape of British girls. But I think readers would agree that there are scenarios where many would sympathize with a victim taking revenge for an act perpetrated against her or him. As a sociological exercise, empathy helps us understand such situations. Had Harris been a woman raped by a man, how many people reading this essay would have sympathy for her? Would they characterize her actions as “a distorted notion of revenge”? If so, what is the source of the distortion? Was Harrow not also an event possibly enabled by a culture that makes it difficult for a victim to seek redress through legitimate avenues of justice? I think the point Souza and Joyce are making is that the fact of sex by deception can be so easily skirted in this case testifies to the existence of a culture that elevates some statuses over others, holding some individuals responsible for their actions, but not others, the double standard determined by ideology.
I close with a case that illustrates the problem, and to once more reiterate my position that matters of justice are to be adjudicated in courts of law, not in our homes or on the street, where violence is only justified in acts of self-defense or the protection of others. I wrote about this case in the essay I cite at the top of the present one. To recall the facts, on December 4, 2024, Brian Thompson, CEO of UnitedHealthcare, was gunned down outside the New York Hilton Midtown hotel in Manhattan. The suspect, Luigi Mangione, was arrested and charged with murder. In that essay I write, “Slain United Health CEO Brian Thompson was not responsible for Luigi Mangione’s action. Those defending the assassin’s actions are engaged in blatant victim blaming. But those working in health insurance are today thinking about where they are and who is present in the wake of an action that anarchists call ‘propaganda of the deed.’”
In its reporting, the Hill connects the practices of the medical-industrial complex to Mangione’s actions. This incident, they note, has intensified discussions about the US healthcare system, particularly regarding the practices of health insurance companies. Critics argue that these companies prioritize profits over patient care, often denying or delaying claims, which can lead to severe health and financial consequences for individuals. Such actions are perceived by some as systemic violence, fostering deep resentment among those affected. The killing of Thompson has thus been viewed by many individuals as a manifestation of this pent-up frustration, interpreting the act as a form of retribution against a system they believe has caused widespread harm through the denial of necessary medical services. Public opinion polls revealed significant sympathy for the shooter’s motives among Americans. A NORC poll, conducted by the University of Chicago, indicated that 69 percent of respondents believed health insurance coverage denials bore at least “a moderate amount” of responsibility for Thompson’s death. An Emerson College poll found that among voters aged 18–29, 41 percent considered the killing “acceptable or somewhat acceptable.”
Alexandrea Ocasio-Cortez put it this way to CBS associate producer Jaala Brown: “All of that pain that people have experienced is being concentrated on this event. It’s really important that we take a step back. This is not to comment and this is not to say that an act of violence is justified, but I think for anyone who is confused or shocked or appalled, they need to understand that people interpret and feel and experience denied claims as an act of violence against them.” I strongly suspect that those who sympathize with Mangione could very likely be among those attacking Souza and Joyce over their tweets concerning the Harrow case—which is not to say that sympathy for Souza and Joyce’s position requires sympathy for Mangione. What I asking readers to consider is why in the reporting of the Harrow case readers are not asked to consider how people who are the victims of sex by deception interpret and feel and experience sex by deception as an act of violence against them? However we classify the actions of health insurance companies in denying claims, one has to tie himself into knots, or cover himself with the gloss of gender ideology, to deny that sex by deception is an act of interpersonal violence.
freedom and reason 